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1. General overview: theoretical framework and key concepts  
 
 
This chapter introduces the theories and concepts 
used throughout the manuscript. It shows the relevance of the 
current research for contemporary sociological and 
demographic debates. It highlights the importance of 
studying in-depth a particular society as a model of the 
general demographic, political and socio-cultural processes. 
The chapter opens with Inglehart’s revised modernization 
theory, which inspired the formation of the Second 
Demographic Transition (SDT) theoretical framework for 
describing changes in family attitudes and behaviour in the 
West a few decades ago. Firstly, developments in both these 
theories as well as the Human Empowerment framework are 
briefly discussed. Emancipative value change is emphasized 
as an important driving force of demographic and social 
change. Secondly, it is suggested to implement a theory-
testing approach when the case at hand is Israel. Thirdly, the 
chapter specifies the contribution of this research to the 
broader study of social change. Finally, the chapter provides 
with an overview of the structure and content of this 
manuscript in regards to the methods, data and analyses.  
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1.1 Inglehart’s revised modernization theory, human empowerment 
framework and emancipative values 
 
The theme of how moral values, attitudes and mass belief systems affect 
different spheres of life has left its mark on the discourse in social sciences for 
the last several decades. While one of the most referred to theories related to 
cultural value orientation has been Inglehart’s post-materialism (Inglehart 
1977), materialist vs. postmaterialist values have become an element of the 
more recent two dimensional concept of ‘traditional vs. secular-rational values’ 
and ‘survival vs. self-expression values’ (Inglehart and Baker 2000; Inglehart, 
Norris and Welzel 2002; Inglehart and Welzel 2005).  
 
Inglehart and Baker (2000) coined the term of self-expression values connected 
to the self-actualization, participation in decision-making processes and 
environmental protection as an expression of Maslow’s concept of “higher 
order needs” (Maslow 1954). The theory of the transition from survival values 
to self-expression values claims an intergenerational shift in emphasis from 
survival concerns related to issues of economic and physical security toward 
concerns about self-expression, subjective well-being, and quality of life. 
Secular and self-expression values emerge among birth cohorts that grew up 
under conditions of rising existential security. During the past four decades, 
these values have become increasingly widespread throughout postindustrial 
societies (Inglehart, Norris and Welzel 2002).  
 
Central components of this theory comprise two-polar cultural traits or 
dimensions. The dimensions across which the value orientation of different 
societies shifts in the course of development are the Traditional/Secular-rational 
dimension and the Survival/Self-Expression dimension. The negative poles of 
the two dimensions (traditional values, survival values) represent the pre-
industrial stage of modernization, while the positive poles represent the 
industrial stage (secular-rational values) and postindustrial stage (self-
expression values) of modernization (Inglehart and Welzel 2005). For example, 
traditional values are linked with religion, family values and a nationalistic 
outlook among other factors and survival values emphasize economic and 
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physical security. By contrast, secular-rational values emphasize secular-
rational authority while self-expression values emphasize individual autonomy, 
civil liberties and an increasing activist role in society and politics (Inglehart, 
Norris and Welzel 2002). 
 
Being strongly linked with various societal phenomena and democracy, self-
expression values have been shown to be stable attributes of societies (Inglehart 
and Welzel 2010). Self-expression values are a worldview that gives the 
individuals a sense of free choice, expands personal autonomy and increases 
subjective well-being (Welzel and Inglehart 2008). The emancipative nature of 
self-expression values shared by a large proportion of population in a given 
society entitles people to govern their lives and enhances equality. It empowers 
people. In brief, human empowerment requires three major pre-requisites: 
knowledge societies, emancipative beliefs and institutionalized legal rights 
(Alexander and Welzel 2011a; Welzel, Inglehart and Klingemann 2003).   
 
Emancipative values are further elaboration of the self-expression values. They 
represent the motivational aspect of human empowerment. These values refer 
directly to the degree to which people claim their rights and exercise their 
freedoms at the personal and collective levels. Two important qualities of 
emancipative values are that they emphasize freedom of choice and equality of 
opportunities for individuals to gain this freedom (Welzel 2013). Emancipative 
values emerge when rising education and cognitive resources allow making 
better informed choices, and when people value the equal distribution of the 
freedoms (Welzel 2012). Mass changes in attitudes and value orientations 
change people’s goals in life and their behaviours (Inglehart and Welzel 2010). 
 
1.2 Recent developments in the Second Demographic Transition theory 
The linkage between value orientation and family behavior has been 
particularly explored in population studies under the umbrella of the Second 
Demographic Transition (SDT) (Lesthaeghe 2010; Lesthaeghe and Surkyn 
1988, 2002; Sobotka 2008a, 2008b; Surkyn and Lesthaeghe 2004; van de Kaa 
1996, 1999, 2001). An essential ingredient of Europe’s Second Demographic 
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Transition is the connection between the demographic and value 
transformations (Surkyn and Lesthaeghe 2004). Changing moral order and the 
conviction that the views and ideas people hold individually or collectively 
have a direct impact on their family related behaviour are the story of the 
Second Demographic Transition.  
 
The concept of the Second Demographic Transition in the West was developed 
by Dirk van de Kaa and Ron Lesthaeghe (Lesthaeghe 1998). It refers to a shift 
on both attitudinal and behavioural levels, or, in other words, to a change in 
opinions accompanied by changes in family behaviour. The change in family 
behaviour involves massive postponement of parenthood; widespread use of 
modern contraception, which enables couples to pursue other goals earlier in 
life; spreading cohabitation and rising union instability; rise in proportion of 
non-marital births; rise in voluntary childlessness and overall decline in fertility 
below replacement level as women cannot and eventually do not wish to make 
up for all the postponed births (Sobotka 2008a).  
 
During the last decades the SDT gained its popularity as the narrative of 
ideational and cultural change due to the overwhelming preoccupation with 
self-fulfillment, personal freedom of choice, personal development and 
lifestyle, and emancipation (van de Kaa 1996). The change in opinions mainly 
occurred in the following dimensions: secularization, rejection of traditional 
religious beliefs and of institutional authority, non-conformism, and 
unconventional moral ethics. It is important to stress, nevertheless, that value 
change per se is not the only factor that has shaped the Second Demographic 
Transition (Surkyn and Lesthaeghe 2004). Value change can be regarded as an 
ideational factor which definitely matters, but other structural factors matter as 
well (Lesthaeghe and Surkyn 2004).  
 
Lesthaeghe and Surkyn (1988) argue that attempts to measure cultural change 
in preferences, values, and ideational goals, are important to warrant explicit 
integration in any theory of family formation. However, the European Values 
Survey, as well as the World Values Survey, is not designed as a demographic 
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inquiry, and therefore, the measurement of family behaviour is rather crude, and 
the possibilities to link value scales with indicators of this behaviour are 
limited. 
 
For instance, in a study on new forms of household formation in countries in 
transition of Central and Eastern Europe, Lesthaeghe and Surkyn (2002) find 
that the entire restructuring of society is the accelerator of the ideational and 
demographic changes. For instance, they find a substantial rise in the number of 
women who do not need children for life fulfillment, who regard marriage as an 
outdated institution and who consider that motherhood for women without a 
partner or husband is acceptable. Still, if one wants to monitor the progression 
of the SDT to the Mediterranean region given that the European Fertility and 
Family Surveys (FFS) of the early 1990s are outdated by now, one is short of 
indicators (Lesthaeghe and Surkyn 2004). 
 
Lesthaeghe and Surkyn (2004) ask rhetorically whether the SDT can spread to 
other continents and non-European societies and immediately answer that “[a]t 
present this is obviously a major new question for demographers and other 
social scientists to ponder” (p. 21). They expect that firstly, traditional union 
formation will give way to other forms in societies that respect individual 
choice, value egalitarianism and where democratic institutions are functioning. 
Secondly, they expect that the rising demand for women’s higher education, 
and self-realization, would cultivate other tastes and life-styles. These would 
lead to sub-replacement fertility. Thirdly, they expect acceleration in the spread 
of the newly emerging behaviours due to global communication. At the same 
time, the authors argue, fundamentalist reactions might also occur when the 
global ideational shift becomes evident. 
 
In Israel, which is placed in the Middle East and is a part of the Mediterranean 
region, the same methodological problems as in the West prevented so far a 
systematic analysis of the SDT. Keyfitz (1986) in a classical article “The 
Family That Does Not Reproduce Itself”, which searches for causes of the low-
fertility phenomenon in the Western world, asserts that “[w]hat data exist on 
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social structure tend to be qualitative and anecdotal. Yet the lack of data is not 
intrinsic, and persistently asking the questions can provide a stimulus to 
gathering the data” (p. 141).  
 
1.3 Socio-cultural paradox in Israel: between the East and the West 
In socio-economic terms, Israel is considered to be a modern society: it harbors 
a postindustrial economy that generates a high per capita income; it is open and 
connected globally and constitutes a formal democracy. In socio-cultural terms, 
however, Israel is a profoundly traditional society (Anson and Meir 1996; 
Fogiel-Bijaoui 2002). Israel seems to be an outstanding phenomenon among the 
high income economies because of the unusually high levels of fertility, 
religiosity and the permanent existential threat posed by the security situation. 
This traditionalism-modernism paradox requires an in-depth investigation since 
it might be the key for further understanding the nature of the SDT process. 
 
An array of family behaviours can be found in Israel, including the most 
profoundly traditional as well as postmodern (Anson and Meir 1996; Fogiel-
Bijaoui 2002; Sullivan 1998). However, the change in family behaviours has 
seldom been discussed in connection with the change in values. In particular, 
in-depth empirical research of family values and behaviours beyond fertility 
and of broader socio-cultural connections has not been extensive. The extreme 
diversity and heterogeneity of society within the State of Israel and the scarcity 
of data specifically designed for research of values and family behaviour has 
posed many methodological challenges for social researchers; many of these 
challenges still prevent investigation of many political, social, cultural and 
demographic ties.  
  
1.4 Current research 
1.4.1 Theoretical and empirical contribution 
 
The aim of the current research is twofold: firstly, it aims at enriching the 
existent theoretical framework of the SDT and filling one of the gaps, for which 
the SDT has been criticized (Coleman 2004; MacInnes and Pérez Díaz 2009; 
Reher 2011) – the nature of relations between the change in demographic 
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behaviour and value change. Secondly, this research explores the SDT in a 
relatively unexplored geographic region: the State of Israel. Although the 
relations between demographic and value transformations were extensively 
studied in the Western world, less is known about this process in non-European 
societies (Lesthaeghe 2010; Lesthaeghe and Surkyn 2004).  
 
According to van de Kaa (2001), the results of one of his empirical studies on 
postmodern fertility preferences and value orientation are not incompatible with 
the idea that the SDT was fueled by the shifts in values. However, he admits, 
they are not particularly convincing either. He is dissatisfied with the fact he 
had to rely on an existing data source – World Values Survey (WVS) – to 
operationalize “bourgeois postmodernity” (p. 324). He also mentions that it is 
worthwhile to investigate the possibilities further as “true” postmodern ideas 
might easily become trend setting if new role models are created and 
broadcasted widely. Finally, he stresses the need to make more attempts at 
integration and synthesis in order to achieve a broader understanding of a 
contemporary society and summarizes with a precaution: “I have seen so many 
detailed model specifications regarding a specific issue, in a specific country, at 
a precise point in time, that I frequently find it difficult to be content with 
accumulation of knowledge achieved in that way” (van de Kaa 2001: 325).  
 
Chapter 2 of this manuscript offers some insights in regards to the points above. 
Results of empirical tests of the relations between ideational and behavioural 
change with the aggregated WVS data are reported. Chapter 2 provides with 
additional evidence to the “footprints” and “anchored narratives” described 
previously (Lesthaeghe and Surkyn, 2006; van de Kaa, 1996). It extends the 
findings globally at the aggregate level and discussed the underlying 
mechanisms.  
 
At the same time, on the global scale many factors may operate in various 
directions, and therefore, produce inconclusive evidence, while within a certain 
country some specific and contextual features may well be isolated and the 
mechanisms may be much better understood. Since the objective of the current 
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research is to analyze the demographic transition as an integrated process, 
which evolves along with cultural and economic changes, there is a need in in-
depth investigation of the underlying mechanisms. Every process of socio-
cultural change is shaped by local constraints as well as contextual and path-
dependent factors. In case of Israel, these are geopolitical situation, security 
conditions, state-religion relations and the religious outlook of the society. It is 
important, therefore, to focus on a single country in order to confront with these 
issues and isolate what might be the causes and the consequences of the process 
of change.  
 
As mentioned earlier, studying Israel is potentially revealing due to the 
presence of a unique paradox of traditionalism-modernism that is of critical 
relevance in the light of general theories. This dissertation will zoom in on the 
different aspects of this paradox. Chapter 3 overviews the SDT in Israel and 
deals with the population composition effects by religious and other factors 
over time and across population groups. A whole array of transitions and non-
transitions, which stem from the large variety of worldviews and behaviours, is 
shown. Outliers are identified and socio-political implications are discussed. 
Chapter 4 tests competing explanations of a non-typical to the SDT behaviour, 
namely, the highest fertility in the developed world. It tests which of the factors 
is crucial as a determinant of the outstanding fertility in Israel. Chapter 5 
analyzes the factors which might hamper the progress of the SDT in Israel. 
These are institutional and social-structural constraints, such as state-religion 
relations that can hardly ever be found in the developed societies.  
 
 
1.4.2 Structure of the dissertation, research questions and methodology  
This dissertation is paper-based; it is comprised of four research articles, some 
of which are already published and others at various stages of the peer-review 
process. Chapters 2-5 are entirely based on modified versions of these articles. 
Table 1 presents a general overview of the methodological aspects in each of 
the research articles. For more detailed description of methods and data, please 
see the respective Chapter. 
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Research questions and hypotheses that are tested throughout the dissertation 
are specified as follows. Research question in Chapter 2 reads: what is the 
nature of relations between factors of economic and human development, and 
value change with age at marriage? Higher age at marriage for women means 
that marriage postponement is taking place in a given society, and that is 
considered to be one of the main features of the SDT. The hypothesis is that 
human empowerment, economic development, higher education for women and 
value change, affect marriage postponement, while the impact of the former 
factors on the latter is stronger than vice versa.  
 
Research questions that Chapter 3 is dealing with are: to which degree a 
generational change in attitudes and value orientations has been pronounced 
among various population groups in Israel? Which group has been altering 
family behaviour over time? Does the behavioural change correspond to 
attitudinal? Have the groups experienced marital and fertility transitions? What 
are the consequences of these transitions? What are the implications of the 
various groups’ growth rates, increasing behavioural differences and 
heterogeneity? Some of these questions are exploratory, and therefore, no a 
priori hypotheses were set out. Nonetheless, four hypotheses based on previous 
findings have been derived:  
 
1) Demographic trends associated with the SDT might be primarily found 
among Jewish non-religious groups and groups of European origin. The 
religious continuum from secular pole to Ultra Orthodox reflects also in family 
behaviour and attitudes. 
2) The Moslem population is found on a pre-transitional level. 
3) Postponement of marriage and childbearing is followed by recuperation, so  
that the above replacement fertility is achieved by most groups.  
4) Such characteristics of the SDT as widespread cohabitation, out-of-wedlock 
childbearing, and voluntarily childlessness are marginal in the repertoire of 
behaviours of all Israeli groups. 
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Research questions in Chapter 4 are: which factor, religiosity or nationalism, is 
the decisive one in explaining Jewish fertility in Israel? What are the relations 
between religiosity, nationalism and fertility and how do they structure a 
system? What are the additional factors that influence fertility? Comparison 
between the proposed set of models, which represent research hypotheses to be 
tested, highlights the strengths and weaknesses of each of them. The modeling 
proceeds from confirmatory to exploratory.  
 
Chapter 5 deals with the following questions: has there been a shift over time 
in attitudes toward civil marriage in Israel? Is there an inter-generational change 
in attitudes toward civil marriage? Which factors explain restrictive attitudes to 
civil marriage? The first two hypotheses are that the support of civil marriage in 
Israel increases over time, and that the younger generations are more tolerant of 
the idea of instituting civil marriage in Israel than the older. The third 
hypothesis is that religiosity and the degree of identification with the nation are 
strongly connected to attitudes towards civil marriage. 
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Table 1: Methods and data used in the dissertation  
 
 Chapter 2 Chapter 3 
Based on 
research article 
Testing the Second Demographic 
Transition theory with seemingly 
unrelated regression: marital 
postponement and human 
empowerment 
 
The Second Demographic 
Transition in Israel: One for all? 
Time frame 1981-2008 
 
1950-2011 
Sample  49 countries representing world 
regions 
Israeli representative; various Western, 
Central and Eastern European 
countries 
 
Type of data 
(‘objective’/ 
’subjective’) 
Survey data on attitudes 
(‘subjective’); official statistics on 
marriage, income and education 
(‘objective’) 
 
Survey data on attitudes (‘subjective’); 
Population Register data and survey 
data on an array of family related 
behaviours (‘objective’) 
 
Level of analysis Aggregate  
 
Aggregate  
 
Unit of analysis 
 
Country Country; group (by religious 
affiliation, religiousness and ethnicity)  
 
Temporal aspect 
of the data  
 
Cross-sectional time-series (2 time- 
points) data 
Long time-series data, and cross-
sectional short time-series data 
Data source World Values Survey (WVS); World 
Marriage Data and Human 
Development Index (HDI) of the 
United Nations; World Bank 
indicators 
Statistical Abstract of Israel and Social 
Survey of the Israel Central Bureau of 
Statistics; national surveys of the 
Guttman Center of the Israel 
Democracy Institute; European Social 
Survey (ESS); International Social 
Survey Programme (ISSP); WVS  
 
Dependent 
variable 
Age at marriage, emancipative 
values, education, income 
 
Various family related attitudes and 
behaviours 
Statistical 
analysis 
 
Seemingly unrelated regression 
analysis 
 
Descriptive statistics 
Generalization  To a theory; to world’s population To Israel’s population 
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Table 1 (continued): Methods and data used in the dissertation 
 
 
 Chapter 4 Chapter 5 
Based on 
research article 
The case of religiosity, nationalism 
and fertility among Jews in Israel 
revisited: theory-comparison using 
structural equation modeling  
 
Religion, demography and attitudes 
toward civil marriage in Israel 1969-
2009 
Time frame 2009-2010 
 
1969-2009 
Sample  Israeli Jewish (and other not 
classified by religion) women  
 
Israeli representative; Arab minority 
(Moslem and Christian)  was excluded 
from the main analysis  
 
Type of data 
(‘objective’/ 
’subjective’) 
Survey data on attitudes and socio-
economic variables; reported number 
of births (‘subjective’)  
 
Survey data on attitudes and socio-
demographics (‘subjective’) 
Level of analysis Individual 
 
Individual; aggregate  
 
Unit of analysis 
 
Individual Individual; group (by the level of 
religiosity and migrational background 
from the former Soviet Union) 
 
Temporal aspect 
of the data  
 
Cross-sectional data; singular time-
point 
Cross-sectional time-series data (5 
time-points)  
Data source Democracy Survey 2009-2010, The 
Guttman Center of the Israel 
Democracy Institute  
 
Election survey, Democracy survey, 
Weekly survey and AVI CHAI 
surveys (various years) of the Guttman 
Center of the Israel Democracy 
Institute; Social Survey 2009 of the 
Israel Central Bureau of Statistics 
  
Dependent 
variable 
Number of children Attitude towards instituting civil 
marriage in Israel 
 
Statistical 
analysis 
 
Structural equation modeling Analysis of variance and OLS 
regression analysis 
 
Generalization  To a theory  
 
To Israel’s population 
 
  
 21 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2. Testing the Second Demographic Transition theory with 
seemingly unrelated regression: marital postponement and 
human empowerment
1
  
 
 
  
                                                   
1
 A modified version of this chapter has been submitted for publication as:  
Bystrov, E. Testing the Second Demographic Transition Theory with Seemingly Unrelated 
Regression: Marital Postponement and Human Empowerment. Manuscript submitted for peer-
review.  
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2. Testing the Second Demographic Transition theory with seemingly 
unrelated regression: marital postponement and human empowerment  
 
 
This chapter is based on an empirical study that tested 
one of the basic premises of the SDT theory that the shift in 
value orientation fueled the behavioural change. In 
particular, the connections between human empowerment 
and postponement of marriage were tested across the globe 
in the last three decades. World Value Survey aggregated 
data 1981-2008 and supplementary cross-national time series 
data on marriages as well as Human Development Index 
(HDI) were used as data sources. Human empowerment was 
measured using two components: human capacities, as 
captured by the HDI, GNI and tertiary education 
alternatively; and emancipative values. Marriage behaviour 
was captured by a measure of singulate mean age at 
marriage. The results of seemingly unrelated regression 
analysis show that the relations between marriage 
postponement and human empowerment are reciprocal, with 
some asymmetry. Emancipative value change has a stronger 
effect on marital postponement than vice versa. 
Emancipative value change was found the most prominent 
determinant of marital postponement when compared with 
other measures of human empowerment. Implications for 
individual behaviour and possibilities of causal inference are 
discussed as concluding remarks. 
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2.1 Introduction: theories and concepts 
Four decades ago, cutting-edge research on marriage patterns concluded that 
average age at first marriage might converge and move world populations 
toward homogeneity (Dixon, 1971). Since then marriage trends show signs of 
growing divergence instead (Billari and Liefbroer, 2010; Huinink, 2012; 
Sobotka and Toulemon, 2008), not only across Europe, but worldwide 
(Mensch, Singh and Casterline, 2005). Several methodological and conceptual 
problems raise challenges for researchers attempting to explain these recent 
changes (Kalmijn, 2007). No consensus exists regarding the causes and 
consequences of these changes (Seltzer et al., 2005; van de Kaa 1996). The 
endogenous relations between demographic, economic, and socio-cultural 
factors pose an array of puzzle pieces. The goal of this paper is to assemble 
them. 
 
During the last decades, substantial evidence accumulated from around the 
globe suggests that societies change their value orientation from traditional to 
modern and from modern to postmodern (Inglehart and Baker, 2000; Inglehart 
and Welzel, 2005). This ideational change started in post-industrial Western 
societies, and continued to spread worldwide. Some of the value change is 
emancipative in nature, leading people to emphasize freedom of choice and 
self-realization goals, as opposed to compliance with traditions and authority 
(Welzel, 2012; Welzel and Inglehart, 2010). Economic and human development 
is strongly linked with the quest for equality and freedom, represented by the 
rise of emancipative values (Welzel, 2012). At the national level, these values 
and attitudes, associated with modernization, are as stable as standard social 
indicators. They comprise societal attributes which are connected with several 
important societal phenomena, such as gender equality (Inglehart and Welzel, 
2010). Empowering economies, emancipative values and democratic 
institutions allow individuals to govern their lives. These three conditions are 
necessary for human empowerment (Welzel and Inglehart 2008).  
 
A traditional view of family, as a social construct, is that it is meant to provide 
security, and promote individual and social stability (Bourdieu, 1996; Keyfitz, 
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1986). Traditional worldviews encourage family-oriented lifestyles and early 
marriage. Holding these views is a survival strategy, which opposes anything 
that might threaten the traditional family structure, such as divorce, abortion 
and homosexuality (Norris and Inglehart, 2004).  
 
As people gradually abandon traditional beliefs and adopt emancipative values, 
the social order changes. Societies become modern and more secular. 
Traditional division of gender roles changes toward female political and 
economic empowerment in contrast with traditional roles as wives and mothers 
(Dixon, 1971). Time and resource allocation for women shifts from their 
families as a primary focus to alternative life domains. Women’s education and 
full participation in the labour force increase the opportunity costs of raising 
children. Changing moral norms further promote changes in mass attitudes 
towards the institution of marriage and family (Inglehart, Norris and Welzel, 
2002). Hence, family formation is delayed and childbirth postponed until other 
important life-goals are achieved. This sequence of events in the developed 
societies has been referred to as the Second Demographic Transition (SDT) 
(Lesthaeghe and van de Kaa, 1986; van de Kaa, 1987).   
 
The SDT theory connects demographic behavioural trends, such as marital and 
childbearing postponement, to the values in Western societies (van de Kaa, 
1996). Being ‘“the” mainstream concept among population scholars dealing 
with demographic change in European societies’ (Billari and Liefbroer, 2004: 
1), SDT theory provokes many debates. Only traces of evidence that imply 
causal relations between ideational and behavioural change have been found 
(Lesthaeghe, 2010; van de Kaa, 2001). Some doubts have been raised as to 
what comprises the initial cause of these demographic and value changes. 
Another disputable issue has been the degree to which the SDT can be extended 
beyond Western societies (Coleman, 2004; MacInnes and Pérez Díaz, 2009; 
Reher, 2011).  
 
Women’s empowerment is also facilitated by the rise in emancipative beliefs 
and higher education (Alexander and Welzel, 2011a, 2011b; Welzel, Inglehart 
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and Klingemann, 2003). Marriage at an early age inhibits educational 
attainment, and attainment simultaneously delays marriage for women (Marini, 
1978). Furthermore, changes in attitudes toward gender roles affect age at 
marriage. The relations of education, values, and age at marriage seem to be 
endogenous and reciprocal. These factors prevented previous research from 
clarification of the mechanisms at work, especially in developing countries 
(Mensch, Singh and Casterline, 2005; Thornton, Axinn and Teachman, 1995).  
 
The current research aims at highlighting the nature of relations between 
changes in values and marital behaviour on a global scale. Providing some 
more direct evidence is crucial for understanding the relations between value 
change, economic development and behavioural change of recent decades. This 
question will guide this analysis. Empirically testing these relations using time-
series data provides a missing link, for which both the SDT and human 
empowerment theoretical framework have quested (Billingsley, 2010; 
Lesthaeghe  and Surkyn, 2006; Welzel and Inglehart, 2008). The following 
sections describe the rationale behind conducting the present study, methods 
used for data analyses, and subsequent results. The paper concludes with a 
discussion of the findings and their meaning in regards to the SDT theory.   
 
2.2 The current research: methodological considerations  
Establishing causality in family research has always been a tricky business. In 
demographic research, the notion that causal relations cannot be established 
without manipulation is regarded as extremely restrictive (Bollen and Pearl, 
2012), and therefore, alternative views are adopted (Godwin, 1988). Ní 
Bhrolcháin and Dyson (2007), for instance, suggested ten criteria for enabling 
causal inferences. When these criteria are met, one could argue that the effects 
in one factor are likely to be caused by the other.  
 
Causal model building, testing and further establishing whether the gathered 
evidence are robust enough to support the theoretical claim will be the strategy 
in the current study, following Godwin (1988). Whether emancipative value 
change and human empowerment can be counted among the major causes of 
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marital postponement in contemporary societies might be seen as an 
overarching theoretical question.  
 
In order to imply any causality, the question of endogeneity must be sorted out. 
Although it has been argued that the sequence of events plays a key role in the 
causal chain related to demographic transition (Lesthaeghe and Surkyn, 2006; 
van de Kaa, 1996, 1997), in endogenous systems many processes occur 
simultaneously. Hence, the relevant issue is not necessarily the sequence, but 
rather the degree of influence of one factor on another and the underlying 
mechanism. The current research questions to be explored and empirically 
tested are: what is the nature of relations between factors of economic and 
human development, and value change with age at marriage?  
 
The hypotheses derived from the theoretical presumptions described above 
would be that human empowerment, economic development, higher education 
for women and value change, affect marriage postponement in a given society. 
That is, the impact of the former factors on the latter is stronger than vice versa. 
Higher human development and emphasis on emancipative values enhance 
marriage postponement, but not the opposite. Inferring causality will be a 
matter for further discussion in the concluding part of this paper. The next 
section presents a method for modeling the relations between the variables and 
studying them as a system.   
 
2.3 Seemingly unrelated regression modeling 
In contrast to relations that can be depicted from one time point in cross-
sectional data, the simultaneously estimated system used in the current research 
analyzes relations between variables dynamically between two time points. It 
quantifies the impact of change in each variable on each other at a later time 
point. This is done in the absence of panel data using time-series cross-sectional 
data on the aggregate level.  
 
Seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) modeling is an advantageous method of 
studying the relations between marital postponement, human development and 
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emancipative value change in the current study. First, it establishes how a 
change in each factor is connected with a change in each other. Second, it 
shows which one of the effects is stronger. SUR encompasses a system of 
equations, where the coefficients are estimated simultaneously, and hence, are 
unbiased in the sense that they take into account the error correlations across 
equations. This feature of SUR is of utmost importance. 
  
The interpretation of the SUR coefficients in the present study is similar to 
least-square regression coefficients in a multivariate model, where a relative 
effect for each independent variable is estimated on the predicted outcome. In 
this study change (delta) between two time points of a variable is treated as 
independent variable. These delta variables are regressed simultaneously in a 
system of multiple equations. It can be shown that change in a given variable 
had an effect on the outcome. If the reverse impact is not found, or is weak, 
then there is a case for causal inference: the variable with a stronger effect 
would be referred to as the cause, and the variable with the weaker or non-
existent effect would be the consequence. In case of reciprocal relations, where 
the variables affect each other, the size of effect of each of them on the other 
can be estimated and compared across equations. 
 
This type of modeling has an advantage over estimating single least-squares 
equations separately: SUR takes into account the highly correlated disturbances 
(errors) of different equations (Zellner, 1962). This procedure is attractive when 
normality in distribution is not present because it still yields consistent 
coefficients (Zellner, 1963). Also, when correlation among variables across 
equations exists, or there is a correlation within an equation, SUR is a valid and 
an efficient procedure, since SUR modeling extracts information from the data 
through reducing the effects of multicollinearity (Binkley and Nelson, 1988). 
Since in the present study the errors at the first time point are strongly 
connected with those at the second time point and the variables across equations 
are correlated – SUR is the optimal estimation procedure.  
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2.4 Variables and measures  
2.4.1 Singulate mean age at marriage
2
 (SMAM) as a measure of family 
behavior 
 
Family behaviour is the dependent variable in this study and it is measured in 
terms of age at first marriage in each country. Early age at marriage is a 
prominent indicator of societal prevalence of traditional family behaviour. 
Postponement of marriage and births to later years has been the most 
recognizable feature of the SDT (Lesthaghe, 2010; Sobotka, 2008), when 
traditional patterns give way to modern and post-modern.  
 
Data on marriage are available worldwide and comprise long time series
3
. 
Singulate mean age at marriage (SMAM) will be used here for cross-country 
comparisons of marital transition. This measure is ‘synthetic’ since it is 
calculated as the proportion of never-married women in each five-year age 
group, starting from the age of 15 until 50
4
. It represents the mean duration of 
being single (in years) among women who marry until 50, and might be 
regarded as an equivalent measure to mean age at first marriage. The latter 
measure might be misleading due to varying age-structure across societies, and 
therefore, is not suitable for cross-national comparisons. Mean age at marriage, 
as opposed to SMAM, underestimates the average age at marriage in 
developing countries because it is based on five-year age-groups, and the 
younger cohorts there are mostly larger than the older. Another measure, 
median age at marriage, is not always available. In few cases when SMAM was 
not available
5
, mean age at first marriage was used.  
 
                                                   
2
 Age at marriage and singulate mean age at marriage are used interchangeably throughout the 
paper 
3
 Data originate from the United Nations 2008 World Marriage Data, retrieved on 22.09.2011 
4
 SMAM might be inflated, when marriage postponement occurs and the percentage of 
eventually married by 50 drops (Mensch, Singh and Casterline 2005), because of the original 
assumption of constant proportions of never-married over time in each successive cohort 
(Hajnal 1953). The current research assumes that this constitutes only a negligible flaw, since in 
some countries SMAM is also affected by age misreporting (United Nations 2009) For method 
of computation of SMAM, see 
http://www.un.org/esa/population/publications/WMD2008/Metadata/SMAM.html 
5
 These cases were Serbia and Malta. Data source for the mean age at first marriage was 
UNECE Statistical Division Database, retrieved on 21.09.2011 from 
http://w3.unece.org/pxweb/dialog/varval.asp?ma=051_GEFH_FirstMariages_r&path=../databas
e/STAT/30-GE/02-Families_households/&lang=1&ti=First+marriages+by+age+and+sex  
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Singulate mean age at marriage can increase under two conditions; both of them 
correspond with the SDT theory and imply marital transition. In the first case, 
when the percentage of never-married until 50 increases in each age group, 
SMAM increases. In the second case, when the percentage of ultimately 
remained unmarried increases, SMAM increases as well. A society, where the 
frequency of marriage in each age group is dropping and where the percentage 
of the unmarried population is becoming higher, is considered as post-
transitional in the SDT literature (Lesthaeghe, 2010). Therefore, both sources of 
increase in SMAM, although not distinguishable in the current study, point at 
marital transition or marital postponement. 
 
2.4.2 Human Development Index (HDI) and emancipative values  
Economic development and emancipation from authority are important 
components of human development. HDI
6
 introduced in 1990 by the United 
Nations is an established indicator of economic and human development. The 
three major components of HDI, namely, life expectancy, national product per 
capita, and years of education represent the resources that increase human 
capacities and individual freedoms (King and Murray, 2001). Although HDI 
has been criticized for being an imperfect measure, and for being too crude for 
measuring development among the developed countries (Kelley, 1991; 
Srinivasan, 1994), both conceptual and methodological advantages of HDI 
surpass by far its disadvantages for the needs of the current research. Firstly, its 
composition has improved since 1990, and includes now also the expected 
years of schooling, in addition to observed, as a measure of education (United 
Nations, 2010). Secondly, it describes fairly well the development if all types of 
economies are present in the sample, and not only the developed countries. In 
addition, HDI, in contrast to GNI, does not solely focus on economic dimension 
while describing human capacities, but overall human development. It is 
available for most world economies and comprises relatively long time series. 
Therefore, HDI was used in the current study to account for development in 
each country.  
                                                   
6 
Data file HDI Trends 1980-2010 from the Human Development 2010 report, retrieved on 
28.09.2011 from http://hdr.undp.org/en/statistics/data/ 
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In order to cross-validate the HDI as a reliable indicator of economic and 
human development, separate analyses will consider GNI alone, and an 
alternative measure of education. This alternative measure of education is the 
percentage of women over 25 who completed tertiary education as a share of 
total adult population over 15
7
. This indicator of female educational level in a 
country is used as an alternative measure to observed and expected years of 
schooling.  
 
Emancipative values were constructed, using the concepts of Welzel and 
Inglehart's (2010) model, and described in Alexander and Welzel (2011b). 
These are a summative index of four sub-indices, which include personal 
autonomy, lifestyle tolerance, gender equality and people’s voice values, based 
on twelve World Values Survey (WVS) items. Emancipative values comprise 
an index from 0 to 1, when 0 indicates a complete absence of emancipative 
beliefs and total deference to authority. Emancipative values used in the current 
research are country mean scores, calculated from WVS aggregated data 1981-
2008
8
.  
 
The advantage of using emancipative values (Welzel, 2013; Welzel and 
Inglehart, 2010) as an explanatory variable in research, which deals with value  
change, is the following. The SDT theory was formulated using Inglehart’s 
post-materialist values as the main factors, whose change gives way to further 
behavioural change. Emancipative values rely on the same theory, and are a 
further elaboration of Inglehart’s original concepts. This research aims at 
testing the nature of relations between values and family behaviour. Therefore, 
it uses the tools developed within the paradigm in order to produce some 
meaningful results.  
 
                                                   
7 
Data obtained from the World Bank data, Education Statistics, Barro-Lee: Percentage of 
population (age 15+) by educational attainment, age 25+, female, completed tertiary, retrieved 
on 26.11.2011 from http://databank.worldbank.org/ddp/home.do?Step=1&id=4 
8
 The author thanks Christian Welzel for providing the data on emancipative values. For more 
details on emancipative values see Alexander and Welzel (2011a,b), Welzel and Inglehart 
(2010) and Welzel (2013) 
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2.5 Data  
WVS
9
 surveys were conducted in waves since 1981, with the sample of 
participating countries varying from one wave to another and increasing over 
time. For instance, some countries participated in all five waves of the WVS, 
while others participated only once. Therefore, the availability of time-series 
data varies for different countries. In the current research, the most important 
question relates directly to the timing of events. In order to clarify the nature of 
relations between value change and marital behaviour, at least two time points 
are required.  
 
The data file for the current research was compiled from several sources: the 
WVS 1981-2008, World Marriage Data 2008, the HDI 1980-2010 and World 
Bank Data 2011 Barro-Lee indicators. See Appendix 1 for descriptive statistics 
of the main research variables, and Appendix 2 for correlation matrix of all 
research variables.  
 
Since the data on values pose most limitations, for these data originate from 
surveys, the countries in the sample in the current study were chosen such that 
they had participated in at least two non-consecutive WVS waves leaving 49 
countries from 6 continents.   
 
This guarantees that the minimal interval required for the current research 
between the two time points is approximately one decade. For countries, where 
data were available for an interval of more than a decade, the maximal interval 
was preferred. Therefore, the length of the intervals differs from country to 
country. These differences were accounted for, in order to allow some 
meaningful comparisons between countries, as described below.  
 
Data on emancipative values were corrected for the length of the intervals 
between the two time points, as follows: in every country emancipative values 
were recalculated for the sample mean of 15.06 years interval. 15.06 years is 
                                                   
9
 See World Values Survey, Ann Arbor: ISSR, University of Michigan. 
www.worldvaluessurvey.org 
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the mean duration between the two time points, for which the data were 
available. In other words, the actual country’s emancipative values at the 
second time point were replaced by the expected one
10, given each country’s 
performance during the years, for which the information exists. The difference 
between them is referred to as change, which can be positive or negative. The 
working assumption is that the relations between age at marriage, values, 
education and human development would remain the same, had the 
composition of the countries in the sample been altered.  
 
The country normalized scores of SMAM, HDI, GNI and education were 
obtained as follows: the score at the first time point is the original score 
obtained in each country in the same year as emancipative values or closest 
available. Then the same procedure was performed as for emancipative values: 
the expected scores at the second time point were recalculated for the mean 
interval of 15.06 years, such that no discrepancies between the timing of the 
occurrence of the events arise. Age at marriage, GNI and education were 
transformed into indices between 0 and 1
11
, where 0 was obtained from the 
minimum score in the sample and 1 from the maximum. Since HDI and 
emancipative values are indices, no further transformation was required. The 
advantage of using indices from 0 to 1 is ease of interpretation.  
 
2.6 Results  
The change in SMAM, values and human development across countries are 
shown in Figures 1-3. Over the time period of approximately fifteen years, 
SMAM has risen in all the countries in the sample. The vast majority of 
countries has also experienced emancipative value change, and rise in HDI. 
These changes in marital behaviour, values and development are not uniform, 
                                                   
10
 Expected emancipative value score at T2 was calculated as follows: firstly, annual change for 
each country was obtained by dividing the difference between scores at the two time points by 
the number of years between observations, and secondly, by multiplying the annual change by 
15.06. 
11
 This transformation was performed using the formula 
minmax
min
xx
xxi


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however, and neither are they equal. Tertiary education rates of women and 
GNI have also increased in a majority of countries in this time period.  
 
As expected from the correlation matrix in Appendix 2, countries’ rankings in 
human empowerment measures correspond to rankings in age at marriage. For 
instance, countries extremely low in HDI, such as Nigeria, India, China, 
Moldova and Brazil also display low levels of emancipative value orientation, 
and among the lowest age at marriage. Over the analyzed decades, some 
countries demonstrated deferencial
12
 value change, as opposed to emancipative. 
For example, Nigeria, China and Egypt, and to a lesser extent such change 
occurred in Latvia, Russia, Turkey and Romania.  
 
Belarus and South Africa experienced a decline in HDI, but this trend did not 
reflect in their values or prevalence of marriages. In fact, they experienced 
emancipative value change and a rise in age at marriage. Not surprisingly, the 
leaders of emancipative value change – Finland, Denmark, Germany, 
Switzerland and Sweden – were also among the leaders in HDI and reached the 
highest age at marriage, which exceeded the age of 30, except Switzerland, 
where average age at first marriage was 29.4 for women in 2010 (Swiss Federal 
Statistical Office, 2012). Overall most countries displayed an increase in both 
SMAM, emancipative values and HDI. 
 
  
                                                   
12
 The term ‘deferencial’ is used originally by Welzel (2013) to describe the opposite of 
‘emancipative’. The word is rooted in ‘deference to authority’ as opposed to ‘emancipation 
from authority’  
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Figure 1: Singulate mean age at marriage in 49 countries at two time 
points 
 
Source: calculated by the author from World Marriage Data 2008 (United Nations, 2009) 
 
Figure 2: Emancipative values in 49 countries at two time points 
 
Source: calculated by the author from WVS data 1981-2008 (provided by Welzel, 2011) 
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Figure 3: Human Development Index in 49 countries at two time points 
 Source: calculated by the author from The Human Development Index 2010 (United Nations, 
2010) 
 
Turning to multivariate analysis, results of seemingly unrelated regressions 
show that the relations between emancipative values and SMAM are reciprocal 
(Table 2). The impact, however, is not symmetrical. Values are a better 
predictor of age of marriage cross-nationally than age of marriage is of 
predicting values. This is captured in the first two columns of Table 2. In the 
first column, the change in emancipative values is a stronger predictor of age at 
marriage at T2 with an unstandardized coefficient of 1.27 than the change in age 
at marriage as a predictor of emancipative values at T2 with a coefficient of 0.21 
in the second column. The same trend is found when only age at marriage and 
emancipative values were regressed in a system of two equations without 
controlling for human development – see Appendix 3. The coefficients were 
1.28 and 0.20 respectively. This is support of the research hypothesis that 
emancipative value change promotes marriage postponement.   
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Table 2: Seemingly unrelated regression analysis of singulate mean age at 
marriage, emancipative values, and Human Development Index in 49 
countries 
 
Equation Independent variables  Dependent variable 
 
Age at 
marriage at 
2T  
Emancipative 
values at 
2T  
HDI at 
2T  
(1) Age at marriage at 
1T  
Change in emancipative 
values 
Change in HDI 
Constant 
0.94 (8.16)*** 
1.27 (3.81)*** 
0.96 (2.12)** 
0.08 (1.54)  
  
(2) Emancipative values at 
1T  
Change in age at marriage 
Change in HDI 
Constant 
 1.18 (9.17)*** 
0.21 (3.48)*** 
-0.25 (-1.24) 
-0.04 (-0.75) 
 
(3) HDI at 
1T  
Change in age at marriage 
Change in emancipative 
values 
Constant 
  0.86 
(13.65)*** 
0.12 (2.81)** 
0.02 (0.17) 
0.14 
(3.77)*** 
 2R  
RMSE 
2  
0.67 
0.124 
151.03 
0.66 
0.055 
129.90 
0.89 
0.035 
401.80 
Notes: Significance levels: n.s. p>0.05; **p≤0.05; ***p≤0.001. Entries are unstandardized 
regression coefficients; z-values in parentheses. Post-estimation tests for multicollinearity 
(VIF), and Breusch-Pagan / Cook-Weisberg test for heteroskedasticity reveal no violation of 
OLS assumptions in each regression equation; Breusch-Pagan test reveals independence of 
residuals across equations 
 
These results appear to be robust across various models. The conclusions hold 
when the variables have a logit
13
 transformation (see Appendix 4). The 
coefficients were 1.25 for the change in emancipative values predicting age at 
marriage at T2 and 0.14 for the change in age at marriage predicting 
emancipative values at T2. The same pattern was found when an alternative 
variable for economic development was introduced. Using GNI instead of HDI  
the coefficients were 0.84 in the first column and 0.11 in the second (see 
Appendix 5). In all these equations, Wald-test of equality of coefficients 
showed statistically significant difference. The only exception, where Wald-test 
did not show significant difference between coefficients, was in models where 
                                                   
13
 Logit transformation was performed using the formula 





 i
i
x
x
1
ln  
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all variables were z-standardized (Appendix 6). This could indicate that the 
asymmetry is rather weak. 
 
Emancipative values and the level of human development, as measured by the 
HDI, explain between 67 and 68 percent of the variance in age at marriage 
across 49 countries (Table 2 and Appendix 4). Norris and Inglehart (2004) have 
shown similar findings: the country’s position on traditional versus secular-
rational scale, together with HDI, explained two-thirds of the variance in total 
fertility rates.  
 
Besides the main finding of emancipative value change that influences age at 
marriage, another system of asymmetrically reciprocal relations – between age 
at marriage and HDI – was found significant (Table 1). The change in HDI is a 
stronger predictor of age at marriage at T2 with a coefficient of 0.96 than the 
change in age at marriage as a predictor of HDI at T2 with a coefficient of 0.12. 
The effect of human development, as captured by HDI, on increase in age at 
marriage is smaller than the effect of the emancipative value change, but is, 
nonetheless, important. It supports the SDT premises regarding the relations 
between economic and value changes as required conditions for behavioural 
changes (van de Kaa 1996). 
 
Table 3 demonstrates the relations between values, education and age at 
marriage. The effects of educational attainment are parallel to the effects of the 
HDI, while the impact of emancipative value change on age at marriage at T2 
remains greater than the opposite (coefficient of 0.99 in the first column 
compared to 0.15 in the second column). Education also plays a role – its 
change significantly influences the age at marriage at T2 (coefficient of 0.31). 
Interestingly, change in age at marriage has almost the same impact on 
education at T2 (coefficient of 0.29). These relations are symmetrically 
reciprocal. This finding corroborates the conclusions of Marini (1978). 
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Table 3: Seemingly unrelated regression analysis of singulate mean age at 
marriage, emancipative values, and tertiary education for women in 49 
countries 
 
Equation Independent variables  Dependent variable 
 
Age at 
marriage at 
2T  
Emancipative 
values at 
2T  
Education at 
2T  
(1) Age at marriage at 
1T  
Change in emancipative values 
Change in education 
Constant 
0.90 (7.83)*** 
0.99 (2.91)** 
0.31 (2.23)** 
0.14 (3.45) ***  
  
(2) Emancipative values at 
1T  
Change in age at marriage 
Change in education 
Constant 
 1.15 (9.03)*** 
0.15 (2.42)** 
0.15 (2.40)** 
-0.06 (-1.14) 
 
(3) Education at 
1T  
Change in age at marriage 
Change in emancipative values 
Constant 
  1.10 (10.58)*** 
0.29 (2.16)** 
0.80 (2.65)** 
0.03 (0.87) 
 2R  
RMSE 
2  
0.69 
0.121 
148.97 
0.67 
0.054 
139.97 
0.69 
0.120 
134.30 
Notes: Significance levels: n.s. p>0.05; **p≤0.05; ***p≤0.001. Entries are unstandardized 
regression coefficients; z-values in parentheses. Post-estimation tests for multicollinearity 
(VIF), and Breusch-Pagan / Cook-Weisberg test for heteroskedasticity reveal no violation of 
OLS assumptions in each regression equation; Breusch-Pagan test reveals independence of 
residuals across equations 
 
 
2.7 Discussion  
The impact of human empowerment measures on the postponement of marriage 
in the last three decades is found to be in accordance with Inglehart’s revised 
modernization theory, upon which the SDT theory is based. The opposite 
effects, despite being weaker, imply that some feedback mechanism is playing a 
role in relations between human empowerment and marital postponement. Such 
a macro-level mechanism may function in societies, where economic and 
human development and cultural changes are further fostered by an increasingly 
large proportion of women in higher education and the labour market – a 
situation enabled by postponement of family formation and childbearing. This 
further promotes overall societal and economic development.  
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The mechanism behind the reciprocal relations between the percentage of 
women in tertiary education and age at marriage may well operate directly, but 
also indirectly via “climate” or context influences. The direct effect of 
prolonged education at the societal level operates by creating an alternative 
occupation to early marriage and its increasingly high opportunity costs. In the 
same manner, when women are not married at younger ages, they are more 
readily available for attending institutions of higher education, which would 
explain the effect of education. In other words, in some societies the vast 
majority of women are being occupied within the higher educational system 
during young adulthood, and hence, tend to marry at older ages. In other 
societies, women are more available for early marriage because they do not 
attend institutions of higher education. Thus, higher education produces the 
observed increase in the share of unmarried women, especially in the young age 
groups, and thus the rise in age at marriage.  
 
At the same time, an indirect effect of education might operate via 
emancipative value change in the society. The rising share of highly educated 
women might create a social climate where traditional beliefs are relaxed, thus 
giving way to alternative worldviews. In societies, where emancipative value 
change has been predominant, it is most likely that a large variety of choices is 
regarded as normative, including postponement of marriage, finite or infinite. 
Social norms are powerful behavioural guidelines for individuals, while social 
learning facilitates the spread of such newly emerging types of behaviours 
(Kohler, Billari and Ortega, 2002; Liefbroer and Billari, 2010). As a 
consequence, women change their preferences toward the type of first union, 
and instead of marriage, choose to enter other living arrangements, such as 
cohabitation, single living, or living-apart-together relations. In all these cases, 
the average age at marriage in the society rises, and so does the variation of the 
age at marriage (Huinink, 2008).  
 
2.8 Conclusions and summary 
Two main findings have been presented and discussed in this paper. Firstly, in 
49 countries around the globe, postponement of marriage is influenced most of 
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all by emancipative value change, when compared with other important factors, 
such as economic prosperity and high levels of education for women. Secondly, 
a stronger impact has been found of emancipative value change on rising age at 
marriage across societies rather than vice versa.  
 
Using simultaneously estimated regression equations, this research has shown 
that value change boosts age at marriage. The robustness of this result has been 
demonstrated in various models, controlling for different competing factors. 
This study has included some major explanatory variables that have been 
suggested in previous research, and therefore, may conclude that no alternative 
feasible explanation can be easily produced. 
 
As to the question of causal inference: the findings support the SDT theory and 
offer a preliminary confirmation of its premises regarding the direction of 
anticipated effects. Doubtless, some feedback effects are present in this system 
of asymmetrically reciprocal relations. Interpretations of these effects, as well 
as the underlying mechanisms, have been suggested. Nevertheless, the weak 
asymmetry of the effects allows speculating about the nature of relations 
between the emancipative value change and marital transition, and implying 
that these changes may be connected not only by correlation. Hence, 
empirically testing the relations between the ideational and behavioural change 
using SUR provides with important insights: it adds to the existing evidence in 
the form of “footprints” and “anchored narratives” that have been previously 
suggested (Lesthaeghe and Surkyn, 2006; van de Kaa, 1996). 
 
It is important to mention that the conclusions cannot be directly transferred to 
individual behaviour, without risk of ecological fallacy. The complex relations 
between value change and age at marriage would be indeed most interesting to 
further investigate at the individual level. This research has been limited to 
aggregate level data analyses since the WVS do not collect individual data on 
age at first marriage. Therefore, further studies are needed to address the 
question of whether the trends at the individual level correspond to those found 
at the country level. The expectation stemming from this research regarding the 
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individual behaviour would be that the predispositions and mechanisms behind 
the effects are likely to be similar.  
 
Congruity among the world regions does not seem to be the trend in regards to 
marriage, although some evidence exists that fertility indeed converges 
(Wilson, 2011). It would be most interesting to examine whether public beliefs 
regarding marital behaviour also match the societal norms regarding 
childbearing. The dynamics of global variation in values, norms and behaviours 
opens more than enough space for future research.  
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3. The Second Demographic Transition in Israel: one for all?
 
 
 
This chapter explores family behaviours and attitudes 
in Israel over the last decades through the lens of the Second 
Demographic Transition (SDT). Although fertility transition 
to replacement level among certain societal groups has been 
previously shown, the question of how the transition unfolds 
in other domains remains open. The goal of this chapter is to 
highlight the diversity of marital and fertility transitions and 
non-transitions among various groups of this heterogeneous 
society, and to compare Israel’s transitions to European ones. 
Emancipative value change, postponement of marriage, 
alternative living arrangements and a growing variety of 
fertility regimes were analyzed. A full range of pre-
transitional, transitional, and post-transitional elements was 
found among the groups. Such sign of the SDT as growing 
childlessness was not found, and the spread of other features 
as unmarried cohabitation and non-marital childbearing was 
found limited. Population composition effects were isolated. 
It was found that the level of religiosity and the country of 
origin are important factors which differentiate family 
behaviours and attitudes. The connection between value 
orientation of the groups within Israel and their family 
behaviours is discussed. The socio-structural and institutional 
constraints that might impede further progression of the 
Second Demographic Transition in Israel are also discussed.  
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3.1 Introduction 
Demographic transition is not a new theme in studies of fertility and family 
behaviour in Israel. Much has been said about Israel’s transition to fertility 
replacement level and the role of immigration in this process (Friedlander and 
Feldmann 1993; Okun 1996; Friedlander et al. 1999; Friedlander 2002). In fact, 
Friedlander and Feldmann (1993) showed that the secular Israeli Jews of 
European origin have reached an advanced stage in fertility transition toward 
below replacement level similarly to Europeans. However, the question of how 
the transition unfolds in other domains remains open. 
 
What the present study adds to this debate is a quantification of the ongoing 
changes through the theoretical lens of the Second Demographic Transition 
(SDT) (Lesthaeghe and van de Kaa 1986; van de Kaa 1987, 1997, 2001; 
Lesthaeghe 2010). In the paper, a range of behaviours related to the SDT are 
analyzed; not only fertility per se. This holistic approach allows synthesizing 
various demographic phenomena in a more integrative perspective, 
differentiating between the pre-transitional, transitional, and post-transitional 
elements, and investigating the complex mechanism of the onset and diffusion 
of the transition process. 
 
SDT is a broad term that describes a variety of changing family related attitudes 
and behaviours. Lesthaeghe (2010) and van de Kaa (2001) distinguish between 
marital transition and fertility transition, which occur along with the societal 
value change. Marital transition refers to the postponement of marriage, the 
emergence of various types of living arrangements, and to alternative forms of 
cohabitation and procreation. The consequent fertility transition culminates in 
an overall postponement of childbearing, and a decrease in the eventual number 
of births.  
 
The chapter is structured as follows: firstly, it tests to which degree a 
generational change in attitudes and value orientations has been pronounced 
among various population groups in Israel. Secondly, it shows which group has 
been altering family behaviour over time, and whether the behavioural change 
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corresponds to attitudinal. Essentially, the question of the SDT is a question of 
change in behaviours accompanied by change in attitudes. Such features of 
marital transition as postponement of marriage, rising cohabitation, tolerance of 
non-marital sexual relations, and non-marital living arrangements are discussed. 
Thirdly, fertility transition and some of its consequences are analyzed. Newly 
emerging fertility regimes, growing proportions of multiple births and 
increasing age at motherhood are examples of phenomena related to fertility 
transition. Special attention is paid to the growing variety of mother profiles. 
Israel’s patterns of the SDT are compared with Europe as a reference. Finally, 
the implications of the various groups’ growth rates, increasing behavioural 
differences and heterogeneity are discussed in light of the broader socio-cultural 
and political context. 
 
3.2 Theoretical background 
SDT theory presumes that the rise of individual autonomy values in post-
industrial economies is accompanied by the postponement of family formation 
and childbearing; greater instability of existing unions; and increasing variety of 
living arrangements and alternative lifestyles (Lesthaeghe and van de Kaa 1986; 
van de Kaa 1987). The widening opportunities in life, increasing freedom of 
choice, and the rising emphasis on emancipative values are nurtured to a large 
extent by an expansion of individual resources and progressing 
democratization, according to the revised theory of modernization and Human 
Empowerment framework (Welzel et al. 2003; Inglehart and Welzel 2005; 
Welzel and Inglehart 2010). However, path-dependent, contextual, and nation-
specific factors alter the course of the demographic changes (Lesthaeghe 1998; 
Inglehart and Welzel 2010). Moreover, regional-historical context, social 
stratification, and diffusion mechanisms lead to a variation in family formation 
within a given society (Surkyn and Lesthaeghe 2004). Although Inglehart and 
Welzel (2010) show that variation in basic value orientations is generally 
smaller within than between societies, there might be exceptions. A case in 
point is Israel.  
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The current paper argues that under certain circumstances the societal-level 
perspective falls short in explanations when faced with cleavages which divide 
societies internally. World views and mass beliefs held by various groups of 
Israeli society, as well as their demographic behaviour, resemble more an 
assembly of different world regions than segments of the same society. That is 
why studying Israel is potentially revealing. This society confronts us with a 
unique paradox that is of critical relevance in light of general theories. In socio-
economic terms, Israel is modern because it harbors a postindustrial knowledge 
economy that generates a high per capita income. In socio-cultural terms, 
however, Israel might be considered a profoundly traditional society, which 
preserves conservative family values (Lavee and Katz 2003), and consequently, 
offers little ground to assume any transition whatsoever. High total fertility 
rates are not the least reason for that: the fertility levels are unusually high even 
among those Jewish sectors of the population that have made the transition to 
modernity (Anson and Meir 1996). This traditionalism-modernism paradox is 
the key for further understanding the profile of this particular society, and the 
nature and mechanism of the transition process in general.  
 
Social stratification in all societies restricts human choice by limiting individual 
horizons (Welzel and Inglehart 2010). Although Israeli society as a whole 
might be viewed as rather traditional, the social groups vary greatly in their 
worldviews and value orientations. Social stratification in Israel is usually 
conceptualized in terms of belonging to the national majority of Jews (and 
others, who are not classified by religion; the vast majority of them are 
immigrants of 1990s from former USSR) or the minority of Arabs (Moslems, 
who comprise about 20% of total population, and Christians – about 2% of total 
population); among the Jews further division by ethnic origin takes place. Two 
major groups are of Asian or North African origin and of European or 
American origin, and the largest ethnic group in 2009 is of Israel born Jews 
(Figure 4).  
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Figure 4: Characteristics of Israeli population by religious affiliation and 
ethnic origin  
 
  Population by religious affiliation in 1949-2009 Population by ethnic origin in 1948-2009 
 
 
Source: calculated from ICBS, Statistical Abstract of Israel 2010, Tables 2.1, 2.2, 2.25  
 
Besides ethnicity, Israel is stratified by the level of religious observance. 
Religiousness is considered an important determinant of political behaviour 
(Shamir and Arian 1999), family size (Friedlander and Goldscheider 1978) and 
way of life (Smooha 2005). Affiliation with a certain ethnic and religious social 
group implies belonging to a community with very distinct cultural norms, 
interests and goals in life (Katz-Gerro et al. 2009). The vast majority of Jews in 
Israel are subject to influences of one or more of these sub-cultures (Liebman 
1997). In Israel’s deeply divided society one of the most recognized social 
cleavages is between the secular majority and the Ultra Orthodox, who aim to 
impose their beliefs and norms on all aspects of public and private life (Smooha 
2004).  
 
The cleavage between religious and secular groups forms a continuum which is 
clearly based on their different world views, values, and norms. It is common in 
Israeli surveys to ask the participants - in addition to the standard self-definition 
of religious identity - to rate the level of their religious observance (Arian et al. 
2008). Such ‘objective’ measures of religiousness, as frequency of church 
attendance, in Israel would produce a distorted picture, since the synagogue for 
Jews functions not only as a place for praying and worshiping, but also as a 
gathering place for broader community purposes (educational, social, and 
political). That is, synagogue attendance is not necessarily a proxy for 
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religiousness. Thus, self-definition of religious identity and rating the level of 
religious observance are considered a valid measure of the respondents’ 
religiosity.  
 
 In 2009, 8 per cent of adult Jewish Israelis defined themselves as ‘Ultra 
Orthodox’, 12 per cent as ‘religious’, 13 per cent as ‘traditional religious’, 25 
per cent as ‘traditional non-religious’, and 42 per cent as ‘non-religious 
/secular’. Among Moslem Israelis 10 per cent define themselves as ‘very 
religious’, 51 per cent as ‘religious’, 29 per cent as ‘not so religious’, and 11 per 
cent as ‘non-religious’ (Israel Central Bureau of Statistics 2010a). Since one of 
the basic prerequisites needed for the onset of the First and Second 
Demographic Transitions is the secularization of society (Lesthaeghe 2010), 
some sizeable and fiercely religious groups in Israel do not fit the typical 
transition profile. 
 
3.3 Current research 
SDT theory predicts the following chain of events as a consequence of 
ideational change toward more individualistic value orientation (van de Kaa 
1987): postponement of marriage, a rise in alternative types of living 
arrangements, postponement of first births, a rise in late and out-of-wedlock 
childbearing, and a decrease in overall fertility. Thus, the major components of 
SDT are high proportion of women aged 25-29 never married, rising percentage 
of currently cohabiting, late fertility schedule, and below replacement fertility. 
Additional components are high divorce rate, low frequency of abortions, and 
high proportion of women using modern contraception. However, the sequence 
is not universal, some stages are country-specific, and above all, there is within-
country heterogeneity (Sobotka et al. 2003; Lesthaeghe and Neidert 2006; 
Sobotka 2008). 
 
Some country-specific features hamper the onset and slow the diffusion of 
demographic transition in Israel. These are the state-religion relations and 
traditionalism of the society. Religion plays a key role in the public sphere 
(Liebman 1993, 1997; Fogiel-Bijaoui 2002; McQuillan 2004; Smooha 2005); 
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the family laws are religious (Gottschalk 1951; Strum 1989); and gender roles 
are traditional (Semyonov and Lewin-Epstein 1991; Stier and Lewin-Epstein 
2000; Safir et al. 2003; Toren 2003; Yaish and Kraus 2003; Stier and Yaish 
2008). Nonetheless, Jewish Israelis gradually adopt alternative lifestyles; self-
expression values are rising (Yuchtman-Ya’ar 2002); and ‘postmodern families’ 
and such form of unions as cohabitation is slowly spreading (Katz 2001; Fogiel-
Bijaoui 2002; Baloush-Kleiman and Sharlin 2004). The leaders of the change 
are secular Jews of European origin, educated, and residing in big cities 
(Fogiel-Bijaoui 2002). These recent findings of changing family behaviour lead 
to the first hypothesis in this paper: 
 
1) Demographic trends associated with the SDT might be primarily found 
among Jewish non-religious groups and groups of European origin. The 
religious continuum from secular pole to Ultra Orthodox reflects also in family 
behaviour and attitudes.  
 
As mentioned earlier, the vast majority of Moslems are religious. The 
modernization of family patterns of the Moslems did not progress throughout 
the 1980s and the 1990s; therefore, their fertility remained at relatively high 
levels (Friedlander 2002). Such behaviours as dating may be prohibited and the 
parents’ consent is needed for a bride to get married (Lavee and Katz 2003). 
The domination of the religious law is interpreted as a facet of cultural 
autonomy of the Moslem community, and thus, is tolerated (Fogiel-Bijaoui 
2002). Hence, the second hypothesis can be derived: 
 
2) The Moslem population is found on a pre-transitional level. 
 
Since existential security concerns and nationalistic outlook are still part of the 
geopolitical realm of many Israelis (Arian 1995, 2003, 2005; Smooha 2005), 
not all features of the SDT might be present. Previous findings regarding the 
national and socio-cultural profile of Israeli society show a preference of large 
families and high value of children (Friedlander and Goldscheider 1978; Fogiel-
Bijaoui 2002; Landau 2003; Lavee and Katz 2003; Nauck and Klaus 2007; 
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Suckow 2008; DellaPergola 2009; Schellekens 2009). The family as a social 
construct is subject to social approval (Bourdieu 1996), leading to the 
encouragement of certain types of individual behaviour. Social feedback, 
normative influences, mechanisms of peer group pressure, and compelling role 
models initiate the so-called social interaction effects (Montgomery and 
Casterline 1996; Kohler et al. 2002). Prospective mothers enter a social realm 
which offers broad kin and public support for childrearing (Berkovitch 1997; 
Morgan and Berkowitz King 2001), and calls for compliance with group norms 
in childbearing evidenced in pro-natal public policy (Friedlander 1973; Landau 
2003; Manski and Mayshar 2003).  
 
Moreover, social milieu of the country (Nahmias 2004) establishes the overall 
moral norms and generates pressures that foster obedience. Israel is a relatively 
small country where social networking functions as a major dimension of social 
relations. Individuals are strongly connected one with another by either familial, 
residential, linguistic or friendship ties. These connections are highly emotional 
in nature, for social relations of Israelis are often described as warm, personal, 
and informal (Smooha 2005). Thus, the existing traditional norms might 
influence the course of development in overall family behaviour. Further 
hypotheses read as follows: 
 
3) Postponement of marriage and childbearing is followed by recuperation, so 
that the above replacement fertility is achieved by most groups.  
 
4) Such characteristics of the SDT as widespread cohabitation, out-of-wedlock 
childbearing, and voluntarily childlessness are marginal in the repertoire of 
behaviours of all Israeli groups. 
 
3.4 Methodological considerations 
Does the comparison between demographic transitions in Western democracies 
and the demographic processes in Israel make sense? Under which conditions 
are these demographic developments comparable? Although Israel differs from 
the West in many basic characteristics (Smooha 2010), a working assumption 
 51 
of this research, following Smooha (2005), is that European countries are the 
natural units of comparison to Israel for several reasons. Firstly, the majority of 
Israel’s Jewry originates from Eastern and Central Europe, and many are West-
oriented. Secondly, having a comparable standard of living, Israel is tied to the 
West by numerous political, military, economic, and cultural relations. Thirdly, 
the set of values known as ‘the Protestant ethic’ brings Israeli Jews closer to the 
West (Smooha 2005: 437).  
 
Yet, one should not disregard Israel’s exceptional social heterogeneity 
(Friedlander and Feldmann 1993). Over a quarter of Israel’s total population is 
not Western and does not wish to be Western: Ultra Orthodox Jews “try hard to 
keep the old ways as much as possible, to reject Western values and to believe 
that redemption will come by strict observance of traditional Judaism” (Smooha 
2005: 424), while Israeli Arabs identify themselves with the Arab world. These 
two groups are outstanding in their reproductive behaviour. Period total fertility 
rates (TFR) of Moslems in 2001 was 4.7 children per woman including the 
Bedouins in the South whose TFR was 9.2, and TFR of Ultra Orthodox Jews 
comprised 7.7 (Gurovich and Cohen-Kastro 2004). Can there be any transition 
at sight for these groups?  
 
Furthermore, these extraordinary fertility rates which almost ceased from 
existence in the 21
st
 century create interesting statistical effects of population 
composition. That is, due to differential natural increase, the population 
structure changes: the share in population of groups with the highest natural 
increase becomes over time more substantial. These compositional effects are a 
direct consequence of heterogeneity in reproduction, and must, therefore, be 
taken into account.  
 
Finally, the discussion of Israel’s family related behaviour requires recognition 
of Israel being a conglomerate of groups with various national, ethnic, and 
religious backgrounds, and the fact that significant fractions of the population 
are immigrants. The theme of how the mosaic of Israeli population has emerged 
is extensively described in the literature (see, for example, Friedlander 1975; 
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Friedlander and Goldscheider 1978; Ben-Moshe 1989; Okun 1996; Friedlander 
et al. 2002; Philippov and Bystrov 2011). The working assumption is that the 
timing of immigration to Israel for Jews has less impact on family related 
behaviour than the region of origin, and the level of religious observance, as a 
result of the two main factors: one, the incorporation of societal norms and 
values in the socialization process, for many women occurred during their stay 
in the country of origin. Value orientations which are formed in early adulthood 
influence the choice of path in family formation (Lesthaeghe and Surkyn 2006), 
and remain relatively persistent throughout the individual’s life-span (Inglehart 
and Baker 2000). Two, some of the immigrant women completed their 
childbearing abroad, and hence, their completed fertility resembles that of their 
country of origin more than that of the country of destination.  
 
3.4.1 Data 
The main data sources are Population Register of vital statistics from 1949 
onwards published annually in the Statistical Abstract of Israel; Social Survey 
data collected annually since 2002 by the Israel Central Bureau of Statistics; 
Israel national survey data of the Guttman Center (former Israel Institute of 
Applied Social Research) (various years); and cross-national survey data of the 
International Social Survey Programme (ISSP) (various years), European Social 
Survey (ESS) 2002 and 2008 and World Values Survey (WVS) 2001
15
. In all of 
the above surveys the sample represents the adult population of Israel.  
 
The advantage of using cross-sectional time series survey data from the same 
source is that the context related distortions can be detected and neutralized. 
The advantage of using surveys conducted at the same point of time from 
                                                   
15
 Social Survey data was received from Israel Social Data Center (ISDC) at the Hebrew 
University of Jerusalem. For detailed description of Social Survey background, methods and 
sampling see http://surveys.cbs.gov.il/Survey/EngHelpTexts/Help2009.htm. For details on the 
Guttman Center data see: 
www.idi.org.il/sites/english/TheGuttmanCenterSurveys/Pages/TheGuttmanCenter.aspx 
For details on the International Social Survey Programme data see www.issp.org, and the 
European Social Survey see www.europeansocialsurvey.org. Details on the World Values 
Survey are found at www.worldvaluesurvey.org. 
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various sources is that by comparing the results one can cross-validate the 
quality of the data from these sources (Beckers 2010). By implementing these 
two types of survey data in the analysis, the current research consorts the 
advantages of both.   
 
3.4.2 Methods and procedure 
In order to clarify the issue of social compositional effects on family attitudes 
and behaviour, the overall attitudinal or behavioural change will be examined, 
as a starting point. Then, the question whether the overall change (if it exists) is 
due to a change in each ethno-religious group, or is merely an outcome of the 
changing weight of these various groups in the total population will be 
addressed. Breaking up the data on fertility behaviour by ethnic and religious 
parameters will allow answering this question. Thus, the groups, in which the 
traditionalism-modernism paradox exists, will be identified. The groups, which 
are characterized by a consistent traditionalism or modernism pattern, will also 
be detected. Signs of transition on a group level might exist, even though on an 
aggregate (country) level these might be obscured.  
 
Last, but not least concern relates to ideational change. Change in which values 
is most important to test? The theory of the SDT relies on Inglehart’s post-
materialism (Lesthaeghe 2010), supported empirically by the World Values 
Survey (WVS) data. The concept of emancipative values, which is further 
elaboration of Inglehart’s original self-expression values, proposed later by 
Welzel and Inglehart (2010) and Welzel (2013), relies on similar theoretical 
premises and the same data source. Emancipative values comprise an index 
from 0 to 1 of value orientation that supports for gender equality, expression of 
people’s voice, personal autonomy and lifestyle tolerance. The index was 
constructed using formative logic. It summarizes conceptually complementing 
elements of liberating value orientation (Welzel 2013). Change in these 
emancipative values is the one that can primarily and most effectively show the 
ideational change relevant to the SDT in any given society. Therefore, in the 
current research, the ideational change will be tested using the concept of 
emancipative values.  
 54 
3.5 Results and discussion 
3.5.1 Attitude and value change in Israel 
According to the SDT theory, ideational change escorts the behavioural one. 
This generational value change is of crucial importance since it is a necessary 
(but not sufficient) condition of the SDT (Lesthaeghe 2010). In order to track 
this change, one needs to account for the time dimension. One way of showing 
change over time, when only cross-sectional survey data are available, is by 
testing the effect of year of birth on value orientation. If one finds systematic 
differences in attitudes and values between the younger and the older 
respondents, one can regard the phenomenon as a societal value change.  
 
Emancipative value change indeed has taken place in Israel, as shown in Figure 
5. Two important trends can be distinguished: firstly, some evidence of 
ideational change is seen from the higher emancipative value orientation of the 
younger Jewish respondents compared to the older. Secondly, a generational 
change in attitudes has occurred on the aggregate level among Jewish Israelis, 
but not the Arab (the vast majority of whom are Moslems).  
 
The emancipative value orientation was calculated in Israel on basis of nine 
items of the WVS, grouped into lifestyle tolerance (acceptance of 
homosexuality, divorce and abortion); personal autonomy (imagination and 
independence as important child qualities, and non-indication of obedience as 
such quality); and people’s voice (priority given to protecting freedom of speech, 
to giving people more say in important government decisions, and giving people 
more say about how things are done at their jobs and in their communities). The 
score 0 indicates total absence of emancipative value orientation and total 
deference to authority, while the score 1 indicates absolute expression of 
emancipative value orientation and a quest for freedom and equality (Welzel 
2012). 
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Figure 5: Emancipative value orientation among Jews and Arabs in Israel 
in 2001 by year of birth 
 
  Jews
 
Arabs 
  
Source: calculated from the WVS (2001) data provided by Christian Welzel 
Notes: Regression estimates for Jews (N=1,002) were based on y’=0.605-0.002*Age; p<0.001   
Regression estimates for Arabs (N=151) are y’=0.433; effect of age non-significant 
 
Gender equality was not measured in the WVS 2001 in Israel, and therefore, 
was not included in the index. Fortunately, however, attitude change on issues 
related to gender roles and lifestyles can be presented using complementary 
data from another source, ISSP 2002, as follows. Analysis of variance shows 
statistically significant effect of age on attitudes, and thus, confirms that 
generational change has taken place. Older people tend to agree more that: 
‘people without children lead empty lives’, ‘bad marriage is better than no 
marriage’, ‘it is better to marry, if people want children’, ‘household satisfies as 
much as paid job’, ‘work is NOT the best way for women to achieve 
independence’, (p<0.05); ‘what women really want is home and children’, and 
‘divorce is NOT the best solution when marriage faces problems’ (p<0.10) 
(calculated from ISSP data 2002).  
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Another important notion is that the scope of value change differed between 
religious and non-religious groups, while the religious groups displayed more 
traditional value orientation, and tended not to change it. The effect of 
religiosity was found statistically significant (p<0.05) in analysis of variance 
within all the examined attitudes, except for the item ‘bad marriage is better 
than no marriage’, where no significant difference was found among people of 
various levels of religiosity (ISSP data 2002).  
 
These findings support the first two research hypotheses. Overall value 
orientation among the Jewish respondents has changed in a predicted direction 
of less traditional and more liberal attitudes toward family and gender roles. 
Both data sources above provide with evidence of generational value change on 
the aggregate level. On the group level, primarily, and most profoundly, the 
young non-religious Jewish groups lead this change. There is also evidence that 
the change occurred among some of the religious groups, although their values 
can be characterized as rather traditional. The most religious groups, as 
expected, were marked by conservative worldviews. No significant value 
change was found among the Moslems. 
 
As some signs of the ideational change were found to be present among certain 
groups, the next step would be to analyze whether the behavioural change is 
present as well. The following sections relate to what happens in domains of 
living arrangements and childbearing. The main questions to be answered are: 
have marital and fertility transitions taken place in Israel? 
 
3.5.2 Marital transition in Israel 
3.5.2.1 Marital behaviour and attitudes  
Attitudes to marriage in Israel are interesting to inspect if one wishes to 
understand the marital behaviour. For instance, seventy-three per cent of Jewish 
respondents stated that religious wedding is important to them, and sixty-four 
per cent stated that couple, who wants children, must be married (Social Survey 
2009). The latter statement is a more permissive trend compared to 1994, when 
seventy-four per cent shared that view (ISSP 1994).   
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Not surprisingly, inasmuch as ninety-four per cent of Israelis aged 45-49 in 
2008 were married at least once in the course of their life (ICBS, Statistical 
Abstract of Israel 2010). Marriage in Israel can still be regarded as close to 
universal. Among European countries only in Bulgaria and the Czech Republic 
the percentage of ever married by age 50 exceeded ninety per cent for birth 
cohort of 1965 (Sobotka and Toulemon 2008). Israel lags behind Europe, where 
universal marriage has ended.  
 
Yet, marital transition unfolds in Israel since the seventies. Despite the fact that 
there has been a mass postponement of marriage among the Jewish population, 
there is no evidence of marked postponement among the Moslems. The mean 
age of Jewish women at first marriage has risen from 21.8 in 1970 to 25.7 in 
2009, and of Moslem from 20.1 to 21.4 (ICBS, Statistical Abstract of Israel, 
various years). This increase of four years for Jews in Israel corresponds with 
European transitional patterns. The mean age at first marriage of Jewish women 
is similar to Eastern and Central European. For instance, in 2005 in Israel 
(Jewish women), Romania and Poland the mean age at first marriage comprised 
25.4 years, in Bulgaria 25.8 years, in Czech Republic 26.4, and in Hungary 
26.7. Jewish Israeli mean age is higher than Russian (23.3) or Lithuanian (25.0) 
but much lower than Dutch (29.1), Spanish (29.3), French (29.4), and Swedish 
(31.5) (Sobotka and Toulemon 2008).  
 
The percentage of never married has increased over the last two decades in each 
age group among the Jewish women. Among the aged 20-24 the share of never-
married reached 78.4 per cent in 2009, and among aged 25-29 it exceeded 
forty-five per cent (ICBS, Statistical Abstract of Israel 2011, Table 2.20). The 
most drastic postponement of marriage is found within the latter age group: 
between 1994 and 2009 the rise in the share of never-married of this age 
exceeded twenty-three percentage points (Israel, Statistical Abstract of Israel, 
various years, Tables 2.19, 2.20). Postponement is also evident among women 
aged 30-34: in 1994 the share of never married comprised approximately ten 
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per cent, while fifteen years later their share increased to approximately twenty 
per cent.   
 
However, postponement of marriage is not uniform; some Jewish women 
continue marrying in their early twenties while others wait until their thirties. 
The level of religiosity plays here a key role. The Ultra Orthodox women do not 
show signs of marital transition at all, while less religious show them to 
different degrees. The scope of postponement of marriage during the last 
decade by the level of religiosity is demonstrated in Table 4. The secular group 
is pioneering with almost thirty percentage points difference between 1968 and 
2009 in the share of single women aged 20-29. The alternatives for these non-
religious women to marriage are non-familial living arrangement; living with a 
partner, and residing with the parents (Einhorn 2005). 
 
Table 4: Percentage of never married Jewish women aged 20-29 by the 
level of religiosity in 1968-2009 
 
Religious 
identity (as 
measured by 
The 
Guttman 
Center) 
1968-
1969 
1986-
1988 
1991- 
1992 
Religious 
identity (as 
measured 
by the 
Social 
Survey)  
2002-
2003 
2004-
2005 
2006-
2007 
2008-
2009 
Religious  38 39 35 Ultra 
Orthodox 
20 22 18 29 
Religious  
 
43 47 50 53 
Traditional 33 51 46 Traditional 
religious 
50 55 66 62 
Traditional 
non-
religious 
63 64 63 73 
Non 
religious 
49 58 63 Secular 
 
69 75 77 78 
Total 
 
N 
38 
 
525 
50 
 
498 
49 
 
321 
Total 
 
N 
59 
 
1,364 
 
61 
 
1,443 
 
62 
 
1,308 
 
65 
 
1,252 
 
Notes: the samples are pooled from the same source because of a non-sufficient number of 
observations in a single survey; in some surveys the distinction was made between single, 
married, widowed and divorced. Italics indicate small number of respondents in respective cell; 
caution is needed in interpreting these data.  
Source: calculated from the Guttman Center data 1968-1992 and Social Survey data 2002-2009 
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3.5.2.2 Factors impeding marital transition 
Besides religiosity, another characteristic impedes severely the marital 
transition in Israel. Contrary to the West, in Israel civil marriages do not exist as 
such. This institutional constraint on the marriage market is highly problematic 
from the liberal point of view (Sapir and Statman 2009) since it limits 
individual freedoms. The authority to certify marriage and divorce lies in hands 
of each religious community. That is, Orthodox rabbinical courts grant 
certificates of Jews; Sharia courts grant certificates of Moslem and Druze; and 
authorized officiating ministers grant certificates of Christians. Marriages and 
divorces performed abroad or ‘alternative marriages’ performed in Israel are not 
included in official vital statistics (ICBS, Statistical Abstract of Israel 2011). 
They are, however, acknowledged and registered at the Population Register for 
taxation, health insurance, and economic benefits purposes (Israel, Ministry of 
Interior 2011).  
 
Marital transition also implies increasing divorce rates. Although they are an 
important feature of the SDT, direct conclusions as to why they rise so slowly 
in Israel can hardly be drawn. No doubt, the status quo in the sphere of 
marriage and divorce in Israel complicates the procedure of marriage 
dissolution. Despite a certain rise, divorce rates in Israel are rather low and 
range from 1.7 (per 1,000 persons) in the 1950s to 1.9 in 2009 (ICBS, Statistical 
Abstract of Israel 2011, Table 3.1). Compared to Europe, in Israel the attitude 
toward divorce as a solution to problems in marriage is quite similar (ISSP 
2002). Consequently, the interpretation of divorce trends of Israelis requires 
caution. 
 
 Rising liberal aspirations might be another reaction to the legislative constraint. 
The secular groups of population object the fact that the only legal way of 
marrying in Israel is through religious ceremony at Orthodox Rabbinate 
(Gavison 2003; Liebman and Don-Yehiya 1984). Their answer might be an 
unmarried cohabitation and non-marital procreation inside these unions, 
marrying abroad, and marrying in Israel in alternative ways. These implications 
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to the situation on the marriage and divorce market need to be further 
investigated. 
 
3.5.2.3 Alternatives to marriage 
Cohabitation as an alternative to a conventional marriage form of union is 
accepted to various degrees among the Jewish Israelis but not the Moslem 
Israelis, for whom this option does not exist as normative (Einhorn 2005). 
Younger Israelis, similarly to Europeans, support cohabitation to a significantly 
greater extent than the older (Malnar 1999). This is not surprising, since the 
younger cohorts are less traditional, emphasize less survival values, and show 
higher levels of self-expression values (Inglehart and Baker 2000). 
 
Interestingly, attitudes toward cohabitation have been positive only among the 
non-religious and traditional Jews (Table 5). In the same manner, the support of 
unmarried cohabitation, which is defined as a substitute or alternative to 
marriage (Heuveline and Timberlake 2004), and pre-marital cohabitation, has 
greatly increased over the last decade only among them. Both religious groups 
became over the decade less tolerant of cohabitation, that is, they seem to 
progress in the opposite direction to the SDT.  
 
Looking at the total Jewish population, one can clearly observe compositional 
effects: the support of pre-marital cohabitation drops from 63 per cent in 1994 
to 62 per cent in 2002 and of unmarried cohabitation from 61 per cent to 57 (see 
Table 5). Even though the support for these behaviours has risen among the 
non-religious and traditional Jews, the increasing weight of the religious groups 
in the total population (due to their extremely high birth rates) obscures the 
secular-liberal attitudes toward cohabitation in Israel. That is, the population 
composition is a strong enough factor to conceal the obvious transitional trend 
of the non-religious and traditional groups. This notion is of tremendous 
importance for future monitoring of Jewish demographic trends.  
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Table 5: Attitudes among Jewish Israelis toward unmarried and pre-
marital cohabitation by the level of religious observance 
 
Level of 
religious 
observance 
1994 
 (N=1,278) 
2002  
(N=1,012) 
Percentage of approval of 
Unmarried 
cohabitation 
Pre-marital 
cohabitation 
Pre-marital 
sexual 
relations 
Unmarried 
cohabitation 
Pre-marital 
cohabitation 
Very religious 11 8 0 8 3 
Religious 28 25 15 26 22 
Traditional 53 59 55 58 67 
Non-religious 70 73 77 77 83 
Total 61 63 65 57 62 
Source: calculated from ISSP data 1994, 2002 
 
In contrast to relatively positive attitudes toward cohabitation in Israel, the 
behavioural pattern differs greatly. The absolute levels of 3-4 per cent of adult 
Jewish population currently cohabiting can be considered as remarkably low, in 
spite of a slight rise during the last two decades (ISSP 1994-2007).  
 
Overall, the spread of ever experienced unmarried cohabitation among the 
younger Jewish cohorts is greater than the older (Figure 6). An exception is the 
youngest age group of 20-24, who might have been not yet fully exposed to this 
alternative. The compulsory army service in Israel Defense Forces (until the age 
of 20 for women and 21 for men) might cause this delay. Additional 
explanation for the seeming decline in ever experienced unmarried cohabitation 
among the young people below the age of 35 is once again the population 
composition effect. Among the younger cohorts there are more people who 
define themselves as religious. Therefore, their behavioural pattern dominates 
the trend among all the young.  
 
If the data are broken up by level of religiosity, there is an increase in ever 
experienced unmarried cohabitation among the non-religious and traditional 
Jews. Moreover, as a prelude to marriage, pre-marital cohabitation is much 
more widespread than unmarried. Pre-marital cohabitation leads by some 20-30 
percentage points (at maximum) compared to unmarried cohabitation. This 
behavioural trend corresponds with moral norms and attitudes towards such 
types of behaviours. The cohort of non-religious and traditional Jews born in 
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1968-72 crossed the 50 per cent threshold of ever experienced unmarried 
cohabitation (ESS 2002). The following cohorts have not reached this threshold 
so far. The question, whether the population composition will ever allow 
reaching such thresholds in future, remains open. 
 
Figure 6: Ever experienced unmarried cohabitation among Jews in Israel 
in 1994, 2002 and 2008 
 
Note: the item reads ‘have you ever lived with a partner whom you eventually did not marry?’ 
Sources: calculated from ISSP 1994; ESS 2002, 2008 data 
 
Nevertheless, until the age of 29 the percentage of currently cohabiting women 
in Israel in 2008 – which is eleven per cent – is similar to some of Europe, but 
generally much lower: about 10 per cent reported cohabitation in Poland and 
Portugal, 11 per cent in Slovakia, 13 per cent in Spain, 17 per cent in Bulgaria, 
21 per cent in Germany and Denmark, 23 per cent in Hungary, 25 per cent in 
Norway and France, 30 per cent in Finland, 33 per cent in the Netherlands and 
36 per cent in Sweden (data of ESS 2008). 
 
To sum up the trends in marital transition: religious women do not postpone 
marriage and do not participate in alternative living arrangements. They display 
consistent patterns of traditionalism per se, so the SDT is not a relevant term for 
describing their attitudes and behaviour. In contrast, groups, who observe 
religious tradition to a lesser extent, do postpone their marriage to various 
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degrees, accept alternative living arrangements as a norm and cohabit more 
frequently. They appear to experience a Second Demographic Transition during 
which the concept of family is redefined (Lesthaeghe 2010).  
 
3.5.3 Fertility transition in Israel  
3.5.3.1 Postponement of childbearing 
 
The trends in fertility transition resemble those of marital transition. The same 
groups show same patterns of postponement in childbearing. On the aggregate 
level, Jews in Israel postpone births, as the figures on age-specific fertility rates 
in a cross-temporal perspective show. The timing of the onset of postponement 
is important: while in 1993 the majority of births occurred at ages 25-29, by 
2010 Jewish women of various ethnic origins have completed the shift toward 
ages 30-34 (ICBS, Statistical Abstract of Israel, various years). However, there 
was no fertility transition found whatsoever among the Moslems, whose main 
childbearing ages remained 15-24. Moslem fertility levels were still remarkably 
high, although these were lowered during the last decades.  
 
Figure 7 illustrates postponement of births among Israel-born Jewish women, 
which is typical to fertility transition. Similar picture can be observed among 
the rest of the ethnic groups. An outstanding case is women born in the former 
USSR. Although their fertility regimes resembled the rest of the ethnic groups, 
the rates were only half as high. In Israel no group has shown below 
replacement fertility so far, except these women immigrants from the former 
USSR.  
 
Jewish fertility is most interesting to analyze by the level of religious 
observance. In 2009 only two per cent of secular women gave birth before they 
were 25 years of age; seventy six per cent postponed their first birth in the age 
group of 25-29; and thirty eight per cent still remained childless at 30-34 
(calculated from the Social Survey 2009 data). This postponement of births to 
late childbearing ages is similar to the one in most European post-transitional 
countries. Nevertheless, the timing of childbearing among the most religious 
groups differed: until the age of 24, twenty eight per cent of the religious and 
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thirty two per cent of the Ultra Orthodox gave birth (ibid). So, if one wishes to 
speak about fertility transition in Israel, only the secular Jewish women fully fit 
the criteria of the SDT. Traditional women are on the way of approaching the 
thresholds and are strong candidates for the SDT.  
 
Figure 7: Age-specific fertility rates of Israel born Jewish women in 1993-
2010 
 
Source: calculated from the ICBS, Statistical Abstract of Israel data, various years 
 
 
The fertility transition aligns with the marital: secular and traditional Jewish 
women postpone their marriage and childbearing until their thirties and further. 
This trend is definitely non-traditional and contradicts conventional familial 
norms of early marriage and early childbearing. Does this postponement of 
childbearing among the Jewish secular and traditional women end up at 
ultimate childlessness or do they manage to recuperate and eventually 
compensate for all the delayed births? Completed fertility which is analyzed in 
the next section sheds light on this question.  
 
3.5.3.2 Completed fertility in Israel  
Analysis of completed cohort fertility inquires into historic fertility of 
women who have already completed their reproductive careers. It shows 
fertility of real (as opposed to hypothetical or “synthetic”) cohorts of women, 
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and is simple for interpretation since it indicates the actual number of children 
per woman. It is most accurate in demonstrating the level of fertility for a given 
cohort because it embodies the tempo effects by accounting for recuperation of 
delayed births. Thus, it neutralizes the tempo distortions of the period measure 
of total fertility (Bongaarts and Feeney 1998). Figure 8 presents completed 
cohort total fertility rates in Israel of women born in 1932-68 by religious 
affiliation, the level of religiosity, and ethnic origin.  
 
Figure 8: Completed cohort fertility rates of Israeli women born in 1932-68 
by religious affiliation, religious observance and ethnic origin
 
 
Note: grouping by ethnic origin is without Ultra Orthodox 
Source: calculated from pooled data of Social Survey 2006, 2007, 2008 
 
The completed fertility rates of Ultra Orthodox Jews and Moslems are the 
highest; the rates decline along with a decrease of the level of religious 
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SDT – rising fertility over the last decades. Religious Jews and Moslems 
displayed high levels of fertility. Although their completed fertility is gradually 
decreasing, the levels were still tremendously high in 2008, even among the 
cohort of women aged 40-44 who were about to complete their reproductive 
career. The fertility of secular women of European origin born before 1964 was 
found below the replacement level: completed cohort total fertility rates of 
these women comprised 2.0 children per woman, while secular women born in 
the former USSR showed the lowest completed fertility of 1.7 children per 
woman (data of Social Survey 2009). Thus, research hypotheses 1 and 2 are 
supported. 
 
The completed fertility can be portrayed by other means as well. For example, 
parity progressions ratios show the percentage of women of a given parity who 
have given birth to at least one additional child. In other words, parity 
progression ratios from 0 to 1 indicate the share of women who progress from 
the state of childlessness to the state of being a mother of one child, and so on. 
Figure 9 demonstrates the variety of fertility regimes in Israel. For example, 
after having one child women from the former USSR exhibited an extremely 
sharp decline in progression rates towards the second child. Such intriguing 
pattern can be referred to as ‘stopping at one’ (at most) behaviour (Hosseini-
Chavoshi et al. 2006). For secular Jews it was ‘stopping at three’ behaviour. 
 
Extreme fertility regimes, which can be characterised as ‘non-stopping even at 
four’, were displayed by Ultra-Orthodox and Moslem women. Their parity 
progression ratios remained relatively stable at very high levels across almost 
all birth orders (more than 90 per cent until birth order four and more than 80 
per cent for births of higher order). In other words, women who gave birth to 
four children did not stop at all and were likely to progress to the fifth, sixth, 
seventh, and more children.  
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Figure 9: Parity progression ratios of Israeli women born in 1932-68 by 
religious affiliation, religious observance and ethnic origin 
 
 
 
Notes: the number of children at parities higher than 7 is documented in the Social Survey as 
7+. Therefore, for high-fertility sub-populations the calculations were based on 8 as the 
maximal parity. This may lead to some underestimation of completed fertility among these 
subpopulations. Grouping by ethnic origin is without Ultra Orthodox. 
Source: calculated from pooled data of Social Survey 2006, 2007, 2008 
 
These heterogeneous fertility patterns have been studied previously: Friedlander 
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population disguises fertility declines of some sub-groups which transit toward 
the European low fertility pattern. Using a period measure of total fertility in 
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displayed below replacement fertility in the beginning of the eighties. However, 
since these authors have calculated a period measure, it could have been 
distorted due to tempo effect of postponement of childbearing. The recuperation 
that has occurred afterwards at the late childbearing ages could not have been 
captured by Friedlander and Feldmann’s period measure. It is, however, taken 
into account within the completed fertility analysis performed in the current 
study.   
 
Comparison with European countries shows that Israeli women noticeably 
differ in their fertility profiles. In the EU-27 completed cohort fertility of 
women born in 1968 was 1.74 children per woman, ranging from the lowest of 
1.49 in Germany to the highest of 2.22 in Cyprus (VID 2010). Only two groups 
in Israel closely resemble Europeans: secular Jewish women are placed at the 
upper threshold of European fertility while women born in the former USSR 
fall close to the European average. 
 
In fact, Israelis, unlike many Europeans in the first decade of the 21
st
 century, 
still keep the fertility above the replacement level. There are no signs of low-
lowest fertility at sight. How are these levels maintained if childbearing is 
postponed? The answer is recuperation of births at late childbearing ages. 
Figure 10 demonstrates the rising fertility among the Jewish women born in 
Israel aged 35-39 and 40-44 over the last decades. Intriguingly, during these 
late childbearing ages the fertility rates of Jewish women born in Israel 
outnumber the fertility rate of women born in the former USSR at its peak. This 
fact stresses the magnitude of the phenomenon of late childbearing. 
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Figure 10: Rising fertility at late childbearing ages among Israel born 
Jewish women in 1955-2010 
 
Source: edited from the ICBS, Statistical Abstract of Israel, various years, Tables 3.12, 3.13 
and 3.14 
 
3.5.3.3 Contraception behaviour   
To complete the discussion of fertility transition, an additional feature of the 
SDT, namely, the use of modern contraception needs to be addressed. Efficient 
contraception is one of the dimensions according to which countries differ. The 
majority in Israel can be characterized as progressing toward European 
standards. In contrast to late 1980s, when the intrauterine device (IUD) was 
most frequently used contraception method among Jewish women aged 18-39 
and the pill was the second most prevalent (Okun 1997, 2000), later on this 
picture changed. According to the survey of the Israel Association for the 
Advancement of Women’s Health (2003), the pill became the most frequently 
used contraception among Jewish women aged 25-44. Twenty-six per cent used 
the pill and another 18 per cent used IUD. Israeli Jewish women have, 
therefore, passed the first phase of the SDT (Sobotka et al. 2003) in that respect.   
 
Abortion in Israel is used mainly as a method of correction and subject to 
approval of governmental Committees for Termination of Pregnancy. 
Approximately 98 per cent of cases are approved annually since 2000. The rates 
of legal abortion decreased from about 153 per 1,000 live births in 1987 to 117 
in 2010 (ICBS, Statistical Abstract of Israel 2010, Table 3.20), and these are 
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comparable with the lowest in Europe: only the Federal Republic of Germany 
ranked lower with 143 in 1985, and the Netherlands with 107 in 1984 (van de 
Kaa 1987). In 2009 in the Netherlands, which may be seen as a country with the 
lowest abortion rates among the developed countries, the abortion ratio was 153 
per 1,000 live births (about 12.5 per cent of these were of women residents of 
other states who had traveled to the Netherlands especially for this purpose) 
(Netherlands, Inspection for Healthcare 2010).  
 
3.5.3.4 Implications of fertility transition 
As a consequence of postponement of childbearing until very late ages, three 
main demographic outcomes can be observed: firstly, the percentage of 
multiple births rises dramatically after the age of 45 due to assisted 
reproduction; secondly, extremely low levels of eventual childlessness are 
found because of the almost complete compensation for all the delayed births; 
and thirdly, out-of-wedlock fertility at those ages rises as well. As a result, 
mother profile in the society changes tremendously. Motherhood is no longer 
the prerogative of the married young women at their twenties or thirties.  
 
 Since some women cannot give births without the means of assisted 
reproduction at late childbearing ages, the likelihood of multiple births 
increases. The incidence of giving birth to a few newborns at late ages is much 
higher than at young ages, when such medical intervention is less frequent. For 
instance, in 2008, approximately thirty per cent of births to women older than 
45 included more than one newborn (Figure 11). In the future this proportion 
could rise even more. This interesting phenomenon is a direct outcome of the 
postponement and recuperation in childbearing. Such developments can be 
expected in post-transitional societies, where the timing of childbearing is 
shifted and subjected to various individual life-goals.  
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Figure 11: Proportion of multiple births among Jewish women in Israel in 
2002-2008 
 
 
Source: edited from the ICBS, Statistical Abstract of Israel, various years, Tables 3.17 and 3.18 
 
Jewish Israeli women seem to catch-up with childbearing despite the 
postponement. The ultimate childlessness is relatively low among all the Jewish 
women, regardless of the level of their religiosity. For instance, among women 
born before 1959, who have just recently completed their childbearing career, 
the highest ultimate childlessness comprised seven per cent for secular, and the 
lowest two per cent for the Ultra-Orthodox (calculated from data of Social 
Survey 2009). Such phenomenon can be understood better in light of Jewish 
traditional familism and affect for children which have been already studied in-
depth (Fogiel-Bijauoi 2002). For instance, 61 per cent of agreed in 1994 and 58 
per cent in 2002 with the statement ‘people without children lead empty lives’ 
among Jews clearly show preferences for having children (data of ISSP 1994).  
 
Furthermore, such a life guiding principle as raising a family was found of the 
highest importance for the vast majority of Jews (data of ISSP 1994). The 
religiousness here had a weaker impact than in other questions regarding norms 
and values. The conviction that one should have children, or at least one child, 
seems to affect the overall population of Israel. It is stronger than the conviction 
that one should marry: a rising percentage of Jewish women at late childbearing 
ages give birth out-of-wedlock (Figure 12). 
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 Figure 12: Non-marital age-specific childbearing among Jewish women in 
1962-2010 
 
Note:  Births to never-married Moslem, Druze and Christian women are not reported in order to 
protect these women from possible violent outcomes of such ‘a violation of family honor’ 
(Fogiel-Bijaoui 2002: 41) 
Source: edited from ICBS, Statistical Abstract of Israel, various years, Tables 3.16 and 3.17 
 
On the total, however, the non-marital childbearing is still marginal and sums 
up to approximately 4 per cent of all births in 2010 (ICBS, Statistical Abstract 
of Israel 2011, Table 3.17). A similar percentage, fewer than 5 per cent, was 
found only in Greece and Cyprus, but these are exceptions compared to most 
European countries, where the non-marital childbearing is much above 20 per 
cent (Perelli-Harris et al. 2009).  
 
Apparently, not every single feature of SDT is present in Israel. Eventual 
childlessness is almost non-existent, out-of-wedlock childbearing is minor, and 
so is the unmarried cohabitation. The fourth hypothesis is, therefore, also 
supported.  
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The growing heterogeneity in reproduction and changing mother profile has 
important implications for the society in general, and for the higher education 
system, where women stay longer, as well as the labour market, which needs to 
adjust to the needs of the late motherhood, in particular. Flexibility, openness 
and readiness to change are the key issues. The extent to which the society, the 
institutions and the markets can successfully adjust to the newly emerging 
family forms and needs, affects directly the individual well-being.  
 
3.6 Summary and conclusions 
This study analyzed recent developments in family behaviour and the 
underlying processes of social change in Israel. It showed that over the past two 
decades most of the Jewish population experienced transition in living 
arrangements, marriage, and childbearing behaviours accompanied by 
emancipative value change. This congruence between behavioural and 
ideational change corresponds with the premises of the SDT theory, and shows, 
using an Israeli example, that the demographic transition echoes to some extent 
the transition toward post-modernity.  
 
This study also confirmed that Israeli society is highly heterogeneous in the 
scope and timing of approaching the transition. SDT in Israel unfolds in a non-
uniform manner. There is a clear connection between the level of religiosity by 
self-definition and the degree of transition along the continuum. The secular 
pole is in the vanguard of the SDT: the non-religious groups experienced 
marital and fertility transitions both on attitudinal and behavioural levels. The 
Ultra Orthodox pole does not seem to approach the SDT, neither in value 
orientation, nor in family related behaviours. Evidently, this group has not even 
completed the first demographic transition, at least in regards to fertility. 
Friedlander and Feldmann (1993) reached similar conclusion. Secularizing 
trends, as well as the liberation from religious authorities, seem to be crucial 
elements for emergence of any significant change in family attitudes and 
behaviours.   
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Although there is no one path of the SDT, which all societies must walk, core 
features are likely to be found in most post-transitional societies. Israel is not an 
exception in that respect. However, some features are country-specific. In Israel 
they are mainly connected to childbearing behaviours. Upbringing children 
seems to be a very strong societal value, which is also expressed at the 
behavioural level. Compensation for delayed births, which maintains fertility 
above the replacement level for non-religious women, extremely low levels of 
ultimate childlessness, and the frequent out-of-wedlock childbearing at late 
ages, clearly indicate that. These features, coupled with the low prevalence of 
unmarried cohabitation, similarly to other Mediterranean countries, imply that 
some traditional family norms still dominate in Israel. One reason for these 
norms are being preserved might be that the religious environment in Israel 
enhances the religiosity of the most secular Jews and even non-Jews who reside 
among them (Lazerwitz and Tabory 2002).  
 
Moreover, Israeli marital transition takes place within conditions which fall far 
apart from the European. As the authority to regulate personal matters, such as 
marriage and divorce, lies at hands of the Orthodox institutions, this status-quo 
has created frictions between population groups that are advanced in the SDT 
and those who are not (Bystrov 2012b). The absence of civil marriage and 
divorce certainly poses a serious social institutional constraint that has a long-
term impact on such features of the SDT as alternative living arrangements and 
frequency of divorce.  
 
One could speculate about the socio-political implications of changing 
population structure of the Israeli society in the long-term. Population 
projections show, that the Ultra-Orthodox group will continue growing, given 
the current fertility trends. The proportion of this group might reach 
approximately 18-21 per cent in the total Jewish population in 2030. The share 
of children will be very large: over the years the Ultra-Orthodox population is 
becoming younger. Moslems might comprise approximately twenty per cent of 
the total population of Israel that year (Ben Moshe 2011; Paltiel et al. 2012).  
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Such rapid changes in population composition affect the cultural, economic, 
and political arena. From the socio-economic aspect, this implies that the young 
and dependent Ultra-Orthodox population cannot sustain itself without massive 
support of the state. The support is comprised of direct payments, as well as 
governmental expenditures on education, health and other systems. If the 
increasing demand for support is not sufficiently supplied in time, the standard 
of living might deteriorate (Bystrov 2007; Bystrov and Soffer 2012).  
 
Redistributive justice questions might sharpen the existing social chasms, 
described in the beginning of this paper. Socio-economic and political struggles 
which have not been settled so far between the groups might further escalate. 
Further studies of political and socio-cultural implications could shed light on 
what can be expected from the differential growth of the various population 
groups. The chances of progression or inhibition of the SDT among various 
groups need to be illuminated.  
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4. Exploring the outliers: the case of religiosity, nationalism and 
fertility among Jews in Israel revisited
16
 
 
 
 
  
                                                   
16
 A modified version of this chapter has been submitted for publication as:  
Bystrov, E. The case of religiosity, nationalism and fertility among Jews in Israel revisited: 
theory-comparison using structural equation modeling. Manuscript submitted for peer-review.  
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4. Exploring the outliers: the case of religiosity, nationalism and 
fertility among Jews in Israel revisited 
 
This chapter tests competing explanations of 
childbearing behaviour among Jews in Israel. Contrary to 
Western high-income democracies, total fertility in Israel has 
not declined during the last three decades, despite some clear 
evidence of Israel’s undergoing the Second Demographic 
Transition. Two alternative explanations at the aggregate 
level address this phenomenon: the first refers to the high 
levels of religiosity as the major responsible factor for high 
fertility. According to the second, high fertility stems from 
the nationalist sentiment, while the connection between 
religiosity and fertility is spurious. Using structural equation 
modeling, the current study estimates the contribution of 
each of these two factors separately at the individual level. 
Religiosity and nationalism were constructed as latent 
variables, based on the individual-level observed measures. 
Supporting previous studies at the aggregate level, the 
current analysis confirmed that religiosity is the main 
determinant of fertility at the individual level as well. 
However, at the individual level, nationalism had an effect 
on fertility only due to its high connection with religiosity. 
Migrational background from the former Soviet Union had a 
negative effect on fertility. Attitudes toward gender roles had 
no direct impact on fertility.  
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4.1 Introduction 
Since economic growth worldwide brings along changes in fertility preferences 
and behaviour, the birth rate consequently falls (Keyfitz 1992). Although 
fertility transition and convergence at lower levels is considered a global 
process (Wilson 2011), the fertility in Israel does not fully follow this pattern. 
Israel is commonly regarded as a progressing democracy, which harbors a high-
income economy (Bystrov 2007). Surprisingly, however, the relations between 
the economic development and fertility do not hold there: the total fertility rates 
are 2.98 children among Jewish women, and 3.51 among Moslem in 2011 
(ICBS 2012). These are the highest in the developed world, and higher than in 
some of the developing countries. Israeli case provides with evidence of 
reversal to the global process, and therefore, is interesting to examine in the 
light of evidence of the Second Demographic Transition (Bystrov 2012a; 
Bystrov and Soffer 2012).  
 
Two prominent explanations of Israel’s unusually high fertility dominate the 
field: Religiosity has been shown as the decisive determinant of Jewish fertility, 
after ethnic origin and socio-economic status have considerably reduced their 
explanatory power (Friedlander 2002; Friedlander and Goldscheider 1978). 
Friedlander and Feldmann (1993) have shown that religiosity has explained 
nearly seventy-six percent of the variance in total fertility of the analyzed urban 
units.  
 
Later on, nationalism was offered as a competing concept for explaining 
variation in fertility among the Jewish population (Anson and Meir 1996). It 
was argued that high levels of fertility stem from nationalist sentiments. Once 
nationalism and the standard of living in the analyzed areas were controlled for, 
religiosity was found to be insignificant. Recognizing the high positive 
correlation between religiosity and fertility, the authors claim that national 
security is at least as decisive in all aspects of family related behaviour as 
religiosity. After all, pressing security conditions in a country might shift the 
publics’ emphasis toward less libertarian priorities (Welzel and Inglehart 2008) 
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and toward greater emphasis on the family as a stable, trusted, and protected 
from the external world unit (Bourdieu 1996). 
 
The goal of the present study is to test these two alternative explanations of 
high fertility of Jewish women in Israel at the end of the first decade of the new 
millennium. It aims at showing which factor – religiosity or nationalism – is 
more influential. Revisiting the case of religiosity, nationalism and fertility once 
more after decades of academic debates on the subject is interesting for several 
reasons.  
 
Firstly, the current research is theory-driven: it juxtaposes existing 
explanations, and seeks to resolve the controversy regarding the two competing 
determinants of outstanding childbearing behaviour for a modern society. It 
empirically tests the theoretical premises and shows which is more valid when 
confronted with the most recent data.  
 
Secondly, the present chapter contributes to the existing knowledge by 
analyzing new data at the individual level of analysis, which was disregarded 
previously. Previous studies compiled data at the aggregate level from 1983 
census and 1984 elections (Anson and Meir 1996; Friedlander and Feldmann 
1993). Fertility, religiosity and nationalist sentiments have been treated as 
supra-individual phenomena. In contrast, this research analyzes individual-level 
data on fertility, religiousness and political attitudes from national surveys of 
2009-2010. It is needless to say that the two levels of analysis differ, and one 
cannot draw conclusions regarding individual behaviour basing on these two 
studies without the risk of ecological fallacy.  
 
Thirdly, the current study defines the concepts of nationalism and religiosity in 
a straightforward manner, thus strengthening the link between the theoretical 
concepts and their operationalization. The concepts of nationalism and 
religiosity are developed in the current study using confirmatory factor analysis. 
Also, much attention is paid to distinguishing between these interconnected 
constructs, especially since Judaism as a religion and Jewishness as a 
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nationality are closely tied. Indicators of internal consistency and evidence in 
support of construct validity are provided. In contrast, Friedlander and 
Feldmann’s (1993) measure of religiosity in the statistical areas was calculated 
as aggregated percentage vote for religious parties in 1984 elections (p. 297). 
Such measure of religiosity might be rather fuzzy, for sometimes even non-
Jewish citizens (predominantly Druze) vote for Jewish religious parties (Anson 
2010). In Anson and Meir’s (1996) study both concepts of religiosity and 
nationalism were derived from votes in the same 1984 elections. The authors 
described in details their method of typifying the studied areas by religiousness 
and nationalism (p. 12-18). However, that method is problematic as well, since 
differentiating between religiosity and nationalism in various statistical areas 
solely on the basis of voting patterns in single elections produces ambiguities. 
  
Finally, using structural equation modeling (SEM), the present study 
investigates the relations between the research variables as a complex system. 
SEM allows generating more comprehensive explanatory models of fertility 
than least squares regression analysis that might suffer from problems of 
multicollinearity (see Friedlander and Feldmann 1993) and correlation between 
errors. SEM avoids these problems and uses all the available information on 
underlying covariance structure and correlated errors. It also estimates the 
measurement error. Besides controlling for observed socio-demographic 
variables, SEM allows constructing unobserved (latent) variables and obtaining 
factor scores, which indicate the importance of each factor in explaining the 
outcome (fertility).  
 
The rest of this chapter is structured as follows: a theory-testing approach is 
adopted firstly, and an exploratory approach is applied next (Boomsma 2000). 
Methods for constructing the measures and data used are reported in the 
methodological chapter, followed by a presentation of the results of the 
structural equation modeling. Broader discussion of the findings and concluding 
remarks complete the chapter.  
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4.2 Explaining the fertility puzzle: concepts and frame 
Jewish fertility in Israel over the last three decades has been above the 
replacement level of 2.1 children per woman, which is much higher than in 
other post-industrial countries. This high rate is partially due to the extremely 
high total fertility rate (TFR) of the religious groups. TFR of the most religious 
group, the Ultra-Orthodox, has been above 6.0 children per woman ever since 
1980. It peaked with above 7.5 children per woman in 2002-2006 and decreased 
to 6.5 by 2009 (Hleihel 2011). Ultra-Orthodox comprised approximately 13% 
of the Jewish population in 2009 (Paltiel et al. 2012). On the religious-secular 
continuum, this group displays contemporary ‘maximum’ fertility in Israel. 
Contemporary ‘minimum’ fertility is represented by women who are not 
classified by religion (the vast majority of whom are secular 1990s immigrants 
from the former Soviet Union). Their fertility comprised 1.5 children per 
woman in 2005-2009 (ICBS 2012). 
 
Since the 1950s, fertility has varied among different social groups, and its 
determinants have changed. While socio-economic status and ethnicity (Asian-
African as opposed to European-American) have been considered as decisive 
factors affecting fertility, religiosity has been later identified as the most 
important source of variation (Friedlander and Feldmann 1993). In addition, 
religiosity has been found interacting with socio-economic status and ethnic 
origin. However, the lack of demographic data connected with socio-cultural 
variables hampered in-depth research of the determinants of Jewish fertility 
(Goldscheider and Friedlander 1981). Questions that remained unanswered are 
how ultimate socio-economic and structural determinants, as well as religious 
values and cultural norms, account for the differences in individual 
reproductive behaviour (Schellekens and van Poppel 2006). The next two 
sections present theoretical considerations and the recent findings regarding the 
determinants of Jewish fertility in Israel. 
 
4.2.1 Traditionalism and religiosity as determinants of fertility 
Religiosity, traditionalism and nationalism are frequently mentioned concepts 
in recent family research in Israel (Raz-Yurovich 2010). Religiosity was 
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identified as the major explanation of high fertility in many studies (Bystrov 
2012a; Friedlander 2002; Friedlander and Goldscheider 1978; Okun 2000). It 
has been shown that overall fertility in Israel conceals highly heterogeneous 
fertility rates of groups varying by level of religiosity.  
 
While fertility rate of the secular group is similar to top European rates, the 
trend displayed by the most religious resembles the natural-fertility regimes. 
The exceptionally high fertility of the Ultra-Orthodox stems from their way of 
life, especially, from early marriage, and almost universal marital fertility. 
Socio-cultural structure of this community, internal normative influences and 
political arrangements with the Israeli governments, limit the individual choice 
for members of this community. High fertility in accordance with religious 
tradition and social norms can be regarded as a direct consequence of living in 
this particularly closed society (Friedlander and Feldmann 1993).  
 
Traditional familism of Israelis in general has been identified as another 
important cause for their preference of a large number of children (DellaPergola 
2009; Gurovich and Cohen-Kastro 2004; Manski and Mayshar 2003). Jewish 
religious tradition emphasizes family values and traditional division of gender 
roles (Fogiel-Bijaoui 2002; Lavee and Katz 2003; Stier and Lewin-Epstein 
2000; Stier and Yaish 2008). The breadwinner role of the ‘main provider’ is 
argued to be still the prerogative of the man (Fogiel-Bijaoui 2002), although the 
increasing number of postmodern families might break the traditional gender 
stratification patterns.  
 
Since the restructuring of traditional family and gender roles occurs at a 
different pace among the various social groups (Anson 2010), it might have a 
different impact on the consequent fertility preferences. Keyfitz (1986) argued 
that the male-dominant societies lead women to constrained choices over their 
life-course, and ultimately translated into traditional family structure. 
‘Appropriate’ gender roles taught in childhood maintained the social order 
where women are ‘properly’ oriented towards wifehood and motherhood. 
Therefore, those sub-populations, communities or individual families, where 
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the traditional division of gender roles is strongly pronounced, and which 
‘protect’ their women from outside influence, might spread whereas others may 
contract (Keyfitz 1986: 152). 
 
Traditional views of gender roles and religiosity have been advocated as 
important determinants of fertility preferences in Israel. However, the question 
of their direct impact as well as their impact in conjunction with other 
determinants requires an empirical testing. The current research will address 
this issue in addition to the main question of interest whether it is religiosity or 
nationalism that eventually influences fertility. 
 
4.2.2 Nationalism as a determinant of fertility 
Nationalism has been suggested in mid-nineties as an alternative explanation of 
the differentiated Jewish fertility. Anson and Meir (1996) asserted that 
nationalistic sentiments are a more sociologically complete explanation than 
religiosity. The variance in fertility of urban areas was explained by the 
differentiation in voting for the political parties, which represent more or less 
nationalistic standpoints of the electorate. Although high fertility was correlated 
with high degrees of both nationalism and religiosity in the respective 
geographic units, nationalism was found a better predictor of fertility than 
religiosity. 
 
 The main argument was that nationalistic sentiments are derived from the 
‘conscience collective’ of the Israeli society within the geopolitical setting in 
the Middle East. The salience of the national security issues in Israel 
emphasizes the importance of group strength. Hence, the groups that feel most 
threatened tend to support the nationalistically oriented parties and have more 
children. This explanation has been empirically supported at the aggregate level 
but the authors admit that they have not tackled the micro-question of how such 
ideology impacts fertility (Anson and Meir 1996).  
 
Similar theoretical arguments have been raised by other authors. Cleland and 
Wilson (1987) claim that in hazardous environment high fertility can be 
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perceived as advantageous for group survival. Nahmias (2004) notes the 
common perception of Israel as a dangerous country and states that Israeli 
“cultural milieu” encourages high fertility (p. 110). Smooha (2005) draws 
attention to “the high risk attributed to soldiering” that influences the relatively 
large number of children per family, and to the fact that “national security 
considerations and concerns pervade all Israeli spheres of life” (p. 429).  
 
Israel is situated in a region where national conflicts arise quite frequently. At 
the individual level, national security seems to be a major concern indeed, as 
national public opinion surveys show. In 2008, 47% of Jewish respondents 
mentioned general and personal security issues (including terror, captured 
soldiers, Iranian threat, Arab-Israeli conflict, army and relations with the 
Palestinians) as the most important problems that should be taken care of by the 
government. In 2007, when asked whether there is going to be another war with 
the Arab countries, only 6% of Jewish Israelis answered negatively and 
additional 10% answered “don’t know”. A vast majority believes that there is 
going to be another war: 18% believe that the war is going to occur within the 
timeframe between several weeks to several months, 42% believe that the war 
might occur in a year or two, another 17% believe it might be in 3 to 5 years, 
and 7% believe it might be in 6 years or more (Democracy Surveys 2007-2008 
data, The Guttman Center, author’s calculations).  
 
Provided that national security needs in Israel are perceived as a major part of 
everyday life, these “low order” needs confine people’s value orientation near 
the “Survival pole” in Inglehart’s terms (Inglehart 2000). Perhaps Israeli value 
orientation is dictated by the issues of security and tends to approach the 
“Survival pole” with greater proximity than previous studies have found (see, 
for example, Yuchtman-Ya’ar 2002). Therefore, the concept of nationalism as a 
factor affecting the number of given births needs to be assessed at the 
individual level as well. 
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4.3 Current research 
The main questions of the current research are: which factor, religiosity or 
nationalism, is the decisive one in explaining Jewish fertility in Israel? What are 
the relations between religiosity, nationalism, traditionalism and fertility and 
how do they structure a system? What are the additional factors that influence 
fertility? A set of models is proposed in order to tackle these questions. 
Comparison between these models will highlight the strengths and weaknesses 
of each of them. The modeling will proceed from confirmatory type to 
exploratory. 
 
The first two models are derived from the previous research by Friedlander and 
Feldmann (1993), and Anson and Meir (1996), while the third model is an 
alternative, which is suggested in the present study. The three basic models to 
be tested in the current research are the following: 
 
1) Restricted model states that religiosity influences fertility. According to 
Friedlander and Feldmann (1993: 300), ‘…religiosity is invariably the most 
important explanatory variable, making the largest contribution to the 
explained variance’. Nationalism was not tested in that study.  
 
2) Full mediation model reads that nationalism influences fertility, while the 
impact of religiosity is fully mediated by nationalism. Anson and Meir 
(1996: 23) suggest ‘… that much of the religiosity recorded in fertility 
surveys is an expression, in consciousness and in the mode of daily living, 
of a strongly felt nationalist sentiment, and that once this nationalist 
sentiment is controlled for, there is no direct effect of religiosity on 
fertility’.  
 
 
3) Partial mediation model presumes that both factors, religiosity and 
nationalism, affect fertility. This model is exploratory and needs to be 
empirically tested. It combines both features of the previous two models in 
the sense that it is the least restrictive and allows for direct influence of 
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both religiosity and nationalism on fertility. It also allows for 
interconnection between religiosity and nationalism. Religiosity has been 
previously found closely associated with right-wing voting (Shamir and 
Arian 1999), which is one of the expressions of nationalism.  
 
The study aims at optimizing the internal validity of the design, in which 
religiosity and nationalism are the explanatory factors of fertility. At the first 
stage, the impact of each factor on fertility will be isolated. Next, more complex 
models will be introduced: these will control for other important socio-
economic and demographic variables (age, years of schooling, income and 
migrational background from former USSR). The purpose at this stage of 
modeling is to test the robustness of the initial results and to identify the best 
fitting model to the data. 
 
At the next stage, another latent construct will be considered as an additional 
independent variable, namely, traditionalism in regards to gender roles. 
Although traditional views of gender roles are connected with high religiosity, 
they differ as a concept. The most elaborate model will include the three latent 
constructs – religiosity, nationalism and traditionalism in regards to gender 
roles – as well as socio-demographic controls. The aim of this part of the 
analysis is to explore the roles of the three constructs altogether in explaining 
the outcome.  
 
4.4 Data and methods  
The data originate from the Democracy Surveys
17
 2009 and 2010 of the 
Guttman Center
18
. The samples in surveys were set as representative of the 
adult population in Israel. The data sets were compiled into one, where Jewish 
                                                   
17
 Democracy Surveys were conducted in March 2009 and March 2010, in Hebrew, Arabic and 
Russian, among individuals aged 20 and over; landline telephone survey. For detailed 
description of background, methods and sampling see Arian, Philippov and Knafelman (2009) 
and Arian et. al (2010) 
 
18
 Former Israel Institute of Applied Social Research. Data obtained from the Guttman Center 
of The Israel Democracy Institute 
(www.idi.org.il/sites/english/TheGuttmanCenterSurveys/Pages/TheGuttmanCenter.aspx) 
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and other women, who are not classified by religion, were analyzed (N=1,051). 
Descriptive statistics of the main variables of interest, as well as the reasoning 
behind the choice of the respective items, are briefly presented in the following 
sections.   
 
The surveys included items on political attitudes, religious identity, level of 
observance of the religious tradition and socio-demographic characteristics – 
gender, age (ranged from 18 to 94 (Mean=47; SD=16); distributed normally), 
migrational background from the former USSR (18% of respondents were 
1990s immigrants from the former USSR, and 82% were non-immigrants), 
years of schooling (ranged from 0 to 30; mean=14.17; SD=2.84), income 
compared to an average household in Israel (among the Jewish respondents 
20% much below, 21% slightly below, 31% average, 19 slightly above and 9% 
much above the average), and number of children (ranged from 0 to 11 and 
above; mean=2.25; SD=1.76; Poisson distribution).  
 
4.4.1 Measuring religiosity at the individual level 
Religious identification and level of observance of Jewish religious tradition 
represent religiousness at the individual level and considered a valid measure of 
religiosity in Israel (Arian, Ventura and Philippov 2008; Bystrov 2012a,b; 
Goldscheider and Friedlander 1983). The two items on religious identification 
and observance are highly correlated ( Pearson
r
=0.77). When asked about their 
religious identity, 50% of the respondents reported that they are secular, 29% 
traditional, 12% religious and 9% Ultra-Orthodox. When asked ‘To which 
extent do you observe Jewish religious tradition?’ 20% answered ‘not at all’, 
42% ‘observe to a certain extent’, 21% ‘observe to a large extent’ and 15% 
‘totally observe’. Religious identity also corresponds with the number of births, 
as can be seen from Appendix 7.  
 
4.4.2 Measuring nationalism at the individual level 
The concept of nationalism at the individual level is defined using previously 
tested items on political attitudes. Individual political attitudes were found 
predictive of political behaviour (Philippov and Bystrov 2011; Shamir and 
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Arian 1999); nationalistic outlook explained attitudes to introduction of civil 
marriage in Israel (Bystrov 2012b); and attitudes to the territories were found 
important in electoral choice between the seventies and mid-nineties (Shamir 
and Shamir 2008).  
 
Nationalism is constructed from the following items: left-right political 
affiliation (7-point Likert scale), degree of agreement that the government 
should encourage Arab emigration from Israel (4-point Likert scale), standpoint 
regarding withdrawal from Judea and Samaria as a part of the agreements with 
the Palestinians (3 categories), and the degree of agreement to give the Arab 
neighbourhoods of Jerusalem to Palestinians as a part of the agreements (4-
point Likert scale). Cronbach’s alpha which indicates internal consistency 
between these four items is 0.68. In 2010 questionnaire of the Guttman Center, 
used in the current study, the latter two questions were not asked. Since the 
latent variable of nationalism is partially constructed from incomplete data, 
caution is required in interpretation of the results
19
.  
 
4.4.3 Measuring traditionalism in regards to gender roles at the individual 
level 
Traditionalism in regards to gender roles was constructed from three items: ‘Do 
you agree that men are better political leaders than women?’, ‘Do you agree 
that men should provide and women take care of the house?’ and ‘Do you agree 
that professional career development is equally important for women and 
men?’. These items are moderately interconnected (Cronbach’s alpha=0.50). 
These items were available for 2009 only, and hence, caution is required in 
reading the results (see footnote 19). Nevertheless, since attitudes toward 
gender roles are theoretically important, they were included in the current study 
despite this methodological limitation. The latent construct of traditional views 
of gender roles requires a particular attention as a separate factor from 
                                                   
19
 The working assumption is that missing data are independent of other data in the analysis. 
Maximum likelihood approach is considered effective in the presence of missing data and 
produces unbiased estimates when the data are missing completely at random or at random 
(Asparouhov and Muthén 2008) 
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religiosity due to the massive evidence of its relevance in the process of social 
and cultural change (Inglehart, Norris and Welzel 2002).   
 
4.4.4 Procedure 
At the first stage of this study, confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) was applied. 
CFA measured the degree to which the items are relevant components of the 
latent variables. Table 6 presents the factor scores of the items that construct the 
unobserved variables, hereinafter RELIGIOSITY, NATIONALISM and 
GENDER ROLES. Table 7 presents the correlation matrix of these latent 
constructs. The aim of this part of analysis was to confirm that the choice of 
items was adequate, and that they reliably reflected the underlying covariance 
structure of the data. Given set of items was validated by statistically testing the 
significance of the factors that comprise the latent variables. 
 
At the second stage of the study, structural equation modeling was 
implemented. Poisson regression models were estimated; estimator was 
maximum likelihood. Models were estimated using Mplus Version 6 (Muthén 
and Muthén 2010). The analyzed models are presented from simple to 
complicated (Boomsma 2000).  
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Table 6: Confirmatory factor analysis of religiosity, nationalism and 
traditionalism in regards to gender roles  
 
Latent variable Constructed from items   Factor loading  
(Standard 
error) 
RELIGIOSITY  Religious identity by self definition (4 categories)  
 Level of traditional observance (4-point Likert 
scale) 
 
0.99 (0.01) 
0.88 (0.02) 
NATIONALISM  Left-right political affiliation (7-point Likert scale) 
 Government should encourage Arab emigration 
from Israel (4-point Likert scale) 
 Standpoint regarding withdrawal from Judea and 
Samaria as a part of the agreements with the 
Palestinians (3 categories) 
 Support to give the Arab neighbourhoods of 
Jerusalem to Palestinians as a part of the agreements 
(4-point Likert scale) 
 
0.73 (0.03) 
0.51 (0.03) 
 
0.84 (0.03) 
 
 
0.64 (0.04) 
 
GENDER ROLES   Men are better political leaders than women (4-
point Likert scale) 
 Men should provide and women take care of the 
house and family (5-point Likert scale) 
 Professional career development is equally 
important for women and men (4-point Likert scale) 
 
0.60 (0.05) 
 
0.68 (0.06) 
 
0.49 (0.06) 
Notes: Entries are standardized estimates (p<0.001); N=1,051; latent variables are scaled to a 
variance of one; global fit measures for this analysis are: Log likelihood=-8387; Akaike 
Information Criteria (AIC)=16859; sample-size adjusted Bayesian Information Criteria (BIC)= 
16933. Source: The Guttman Center, Democracy Surveys 2009-2010  
 
Table 7: Correlation matrix of latent variables 
 RELIGIOSITY NATIONALISM GENDER ROLES  
RELIGIOSITY 1.00   
NATIONALISM 0.65*** 1.00  
GENDER ROLES  0.34*** 0.52***  1.00 
 
Notes: Significance levels ***p<0.001 **p<0.05; N=1,051 
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4.5 Results and discussion  
4.5.1 Factors influencing Jewish fertility in Israel: religiosity vs nationalism  
In line with the previous studies at the aggregate level (Anson and Meir 1996; 
Friedlander and Feldmann 1993), a positive effect of religiosity on fertility was 
found in this study at the individual level as well (Table 8). The effect was 
found to be invariably strong and statistically significant in all models. That is, 
contrary to Anson and Meir’s (1996) argument, the effect of religiosity was not 
spurious at all at the individual level; on the contrary, it was found to be the 
most prominent. The probability of giving birth to a child increased if the 
woman was religious, controlling for other factors (age, nationalism, being born 
in USSR, years of schooling and income). Therefore, the full mediation model, 
where the impact of religiosity was completely mediated by nationalism, is not 
amenable. The association between religiosity and fertility seem to be 
straightforward.  
 
Surprisingly, however, spurious association was found between nationalism and 
fertility at the individual level, in contrast to Anson and Meir’s (1996) findings 
at the aggregate level (Figure 13). This full mediation of nationalism by 
religiosity was not expected, since nationalism could have been at least partially 
mediated, and had some direct effect of its own. A comparison between Model 
2 and 3 in Table 8 indicates that once religiosity was introduced, the effect of 
nationalism became insignificant. Only when religiosity was omitted from the 
regression equation, did nationalism have an impact on fertility. However, 
omitting an important factor from the model created biased estimates and 
increased the error term. That can be seen from comparison of the goodness-of-
fit measures (AIC and BIC) of the first two models, when the omission of 
religiosity worsened the fit of model 2 compared to 1. The conclusion is that 
religiosity remains the most important factor in explaining fertility at the 
individual level. Nationalism may influence fertility only indirectly via its very 
strong connection with religiosity. 
 
Studies of fertility behaviour in Europe and the U.S. also showed its connection 
with the level of religiosity. On average, religious women had more children 
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than non-religious (Philipov and Berghammer 2007; Westoff and Marshall 
2010). This general pattern has been explained by social structural factors, such 
as social networks and community, and by traditional views of family and 
gender roles that are connected with religiousness. Interestingly, in Austria no 
significant differences were found between levels of religiosity of the parents of 
two versus three of more children (Berghammer 2012), but in Israel this was 
obviously not the case. 
 
Table 8: Structural equation modeling of number of children among 
Jewish women in Israel in 2009-2010 
 
Model 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Factor  Factor loadings (standard errors) 
RELIGIOSITY 0.64*** 
(0.03) 
 0.73***      
(0.06) 
0.63***    
(0.07) 
0.61***        
(0.07) 
0.56***        
(0.07) 
NATIONALISM  0.59*** 
(0.04) 
-0.13*      
(0.08) 
-0.03      
(0.08) 
-0.01  
(0.08) 
0.06      
(0.08) 
Born USSR    -0.23***       
(0.05) 
-0.24***        
(0.05) 
-0.26***       
(0.06) 
Years of schooling     0.11**      
(0.04) 
0.08*      
(0.06) 
Income      0.15**      
(0.05) 
N 1,024 1,024 1,024 1,024 1,007 844 
Akaike Information 
Criteria (AIC) 
15209           15297 15207 15189 14993 12612 
Sample-size adjusted 
Bayesian Information 
Criteria (BIC)    
15260 15348 15260 15244 15049 12664 
Log likelihood -7575 -7619 -7573 -7563 -7464 -6273 
 
Notes: Significance levels ***p<0.001 **p<0.05 *p<0.10 n.s. p>0.10; dependent variable 
(number of children) was specified as a count variable in all models; estimated parameter of 
log(age) was fixed at one and controlled for in all models; Poisson models were estimated; 
estimator maximum likelihood. Latent variables (capitalized) are scaled to a variance of one; 
entries are standardized estimates; in models 5 and 6 there are missing data on years of 
schooling and income, and hence, N is smaller. Source: The Guttman Center, Democracy 
Surveys 2009-2010  
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Figure 13: Comprehensive model of fertility among Jewish women in Israel 
2009 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes: Entries are standardized estimates; significance levels ***p<0.001 **p<0.05 *p<0.10 
n.s. p>0.10; latent variables are scaled to a variance of one; global fit measures are: Log 
likelihood=-8260 AIC=16618 Sample-size adjusted BIC=16694; dependent variable (number of 
children) was specified as a count variable; estimated parameter of log(age) was fixed at one; 
Poisson model was estimated; estimator maximum likelihood. Latent variables (capitalized) are 
scaled to a variance of one; N=844 
 
4.5.2 Additional factors influencing fertility 
Figure 13 demonstrates the system of relations between various factors 
affecting fertility at the individual level. Among the tested variables, the 
strongest direct impact on fertility is that of religiosity: increase in religiosity 
significantly increases the probability of giving a birth. Other important factors 
that were tested and found directly influencing fertility are migrational 
background from the former Soviet Union, income and education. 
 
The negative effect of being a 1990s migrant from the former USSR on the 
other hand, was an expected outcome and has been previously described in 
demographic literature (Bystrov 2012a; Nahmias 2004). The probability of 
NATIONALISM GENDER ROLES 
RELIGIOSITY 
N Children 
Income Age 
Born USSR 
Identity 
Observance 
Emigration 
Voting 
Territories 
Jerusalem 
Leadership Labour division  
.52*** 
.30*** .63*** 
-.27*** 
.15** 
.55*** 
.79*** 
.57*** 
.64*** 
.84*** 
.52*** 
.73*** 
.67*** 
.90*** 
.99*** 
n.s. n.s. 
Career 
.48*** 
Years of schooling .09* 
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giving a birth decreased if the woman was a 1990s migrant from the former 
USSR (Figure 2). Although the effect was of a small-to-medium size, it was 
significant and robust across various models (Table 8). 
 
The positive but rather weak effect of education on fertility is found in the 
current study. This positive relationship has also been found by Schellekens 
(2009); the possible explanation was that family allowances that are instituted 
in Israel since 1975 reduce opportunity costs of having an additional child for 
highly educated women compared to less educated women. That is, having a 
larger family is relatively more affordable for more educated individuals. This 
may be for various reasons – greater flexibility in combining paid work outside 
and household responsibilities, more efficient ways of childrearing, and overall 
less forgone hours and years, and consequently, less lost earnings over the 
lifetime (Schellekens 2009). 
 
Traditionalism in regards to gender roles did not have a significant direct effect 
on the likelihood of giving any additional births. However, it had some indirect 
effect on the number of born children via religiosity, and an additional indirect 
effect via nationalism and its connection to religiosity. Therefore, theoretical 
expectations that upholding traditional views of gender roles might influence 
fertility have not been empirically supported.  
 
4.6 Summary and conclusions 
This article provided with some new insights into the old topic of searching for 
the reasons of high fertility in Israel. It contributed to the accuracy of 
description of the reproductive behavior of Israeli society by using a direct 
approach to measuring religiosity and nationalism from the large-scale national 
survey data. The precision in identifying the level of religiosity enabled 
establishing some important links between fertility, religiosity and political 
orientation of Israelis.  
 
Clear evidence of religiosity being a major determinant of fertility compared to 
other factors at the individual level was presented. Alternative explanation of 
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nationalism at the aggregate level by Anson and Meir (1996) did not find any 
further support at the individual level, although a strong link between 
nationalistic attitudes and high level of religiosity was found. Structural 
equation modeling confirmed that nationalism was mediated by religiosity 
which influences fertility, but not vice versa. The lack of congruence between 
the previous findings at the aggregate level and the current findings at the 
individual level suggests that the presumed mechanism of the national survival 
via increased reproduction does not seem to be a parsimonious explanation of 
Jewish fertility. 
 
In contrast to the previously found negative association between education and 
fertility, as well as between income and fertility (Goldscheider and Friedlander 
1981; Westoff and Marshall 2010), in the current research, income and years of 
schooling have shown a weak positive effect on the number of children. 
Perhaps the heterogeneity within the high-fertility groups in regards to 
education and employment is responsible for this weak connection. For 
instance, contrary to the traditional breadwinner role of the man, in Ultra-
Orthodox families women are the ones who are employed (mostly in education 
and other services sector) while men devote their time to religious studies 
(Friedlander and Feldmann 1993). Therefore, more complex relations between 
higher education, employment, income and fertility might be found. In-depth 
investigation of the impact of these interactions was not, however, the goal of 
this study. 
 
1990s migrational background from the former USSR had a negative effect on 
the number of children, thus corroborating previous findings (Bystrov 2012a; 
Nahmias 2004). The weak and indirect evidence of the connection between 
attitudes toward gender roles and the number of children might have been due 
to the limitation of the measurement instrument. It would be most interesting to 
further investigate the link between traditional views of gender roles, religiosity 
and fertility.  
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Finally, van de Kaa describes the postmodern fertility preferences as follows: 
“The emotional satisfactions of parenthood can be achieved most economically 
by having one or perhaps two children” (van de Kaa 1987: 6). Populations that 
are not part of the postmodern world but have the same aspirations tend to 
reduce their fertility levels. In Israel, some groups do not wish to be postmodern 
or modern at all (Friedlander 1973; Smooha 2005); in this case, high fertility is 
the thing of the past, present and foreseeable future. 
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20
 A modified version of this chapter has been published as:  
Bystrov, E. 2012. Religion, demography and attitudes toward civil marriage in Israel 1969-
2009. Current Sociology, 60 (6): 751-770. 
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5. Factors impeding the SDT in Israel: past and future 
 
In the developed world, Israel is the only country 
without a civil option of regulating personal matters. 
Determinants of changes in attitudes towards the introduction 
of the civil marriage in 1969-2009 among the Jewish 
population are the focus of this paper. According to the 
Human Empowerment framework, the support of civil 
marriage should increase over time, and the younger should 
be more permissive than the older. However, despite the 
growing support among all population groups, the changes in 
population composition influence negatively the overall 
attitude. Being religious, the younger cohorts inhibit the 
trend of permitting the couples to marry any way they 
choose. Besides religiosity, the attitude towards civil option 
can be predicted by the degree of identification with the 
nation, and migrational background from the former Soviet 
Union. The relative impact of the two demographic forces – 
the natural increase of the religious versus the immigration – 
is analyzed and discussed. Further theoretical implications 
are suggested. 
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5.1 Introduction 
The traditionalism-modernism paradox of the contemporary Israeli society has 
been puzzling social researchers for quite a while. Theoretical expectations 
stemming from Israel’s relatively high socio-economic position among world 
economies would be that Israel, like every other post-industrial state, is also 
progressive in its human development. However, despite the fact that the State 
of Israel is modern, the vast majority of the public marries in religious 
ceremonies. The crucial question ‘why won’t there be civil marriage any time 
soon in Israel?’ in the title of Fogiel-Bijaoui’s (2003) article was not meant to 
be rhetorical. There are no laws regulating civil marriage or civil divorce in 
Israel. Religious personal law is the only law regulating the familial status of 
Israeli citizens
21
. Intermarriage is still excluded as such, at least for non-
Moslems
22
. So far, the introduction of the civil option has been rejected by the 
Israeli parliament (de Blois, 2010).  
 
Authoritative power over regulating personal matters was granted to the 
Orthodox religious institutions by the state leadership in 1953, as part of the so 
called ‘status quo’ agreements, in an attempt to create national solidarity. This 
status quo has created frictions among the societal groups and been repeatedly 
challenged. Some scholars hold the view that this conflict will remain unsolved 
in the foreseeable future (Fogiel-Bijaoui, 2002; Lifshitz, 2006) and will hardly 
ever become less acute (Englard, 1987). 
 
Galanter and Krishnan (2001), on the contrary, argue that Israel is moving 
towards secularization, and the religious style of administering family law gives 
way to state supervision. The bold decision of the Supreme Court in the sixties 
functions as a binding precedent for recognizing civil marriages performed 
abroad (Sapir and Statman, 2009). Although this possibility of obtaining civil 
                                                   
21 This paper focuses on the Jewish Israelis as a research population. Analysis of the situation 
regarding the family law of Moslems, Christians and Druze, who enact the personal law within 
separate systems, is beyond the scope of the current research 
22 Moslem men are allowed to marry a non-Moslem woman according to Hanafi law if she 
belongs to the ‘people of the Book’, that is Jews or Christians (Abudabbeh, 1996: 428); the 
Moslem law based on this doctrine is still in force in Israeli Shari’a courts which are the 
heritage of the Ottoman Empire (Khadduri, 1978)  
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marriage abroad opened a back door for couples who wish to circumvent the 
religious law
23
, it is problematic from the liberal point of view (ibid) and is not 
sustainable as a solution (Gavison, 2003). As Aharon Barak, the former 
President of the Supreme Court of Israel, expressed: “This situation continues 
for political reasons… It violates human rights… It is a question we shall have 
to solve soon… It is a time bomb that, if not dealt with properly, may have 
severe consequences” (Barak, 2002).  
 
Current research aims at mapping the contemporary state of affairs in the 
dispute between state-religion and state-society relations regarding the 
institution of marriage in Israel. Worldviews of the society on the institution of 
civil marriage are the focus of attention. This study examines the questions as to 
whether the public is inclined to preserve the so called status-quo or introduce a 
secular path in the regulation of personal matters, and which societal factors 
explain these standpoints. In particular, attitudes toward civil marriage in Israel 
from a comparative perspective across time and societal groups are analyzed.  
 
The first part of the chapter introduces the recent changes in socio-cultural 
structure alongside the political processes involving civil marriage. The second 
part demonstrates how public opinion in regards to civil marriage fluctuates as a 
result of differential growth rate of the various population groups. It shows the 
growing potential of the religious groups to shift the balance according to their 
worldviews. The third part concentrates on the reasons as to why the liberal 
views toward marriage might prevail among certain individuals but not others.  
 
  
                                                   
23 In 2000-6 about 13% percent of Jewish Israeli couples have married abroad (Israel Central 
Bureau of Statistics 2007, author’s calculations). The leading destination for civil marriage 
abroad was Cyprus followed by FSU, USA and Bulgaria. In 2006 the Czech Republic became 
the second major destination (ibid). The share of immigrants from the former Soviet Union 
(FSU) among the marrying abroad in 2000 was approximately 42% (Dovrin, 2006), and it 
remained so throughout the period 2000-6 (Israel Central Bureau of Statistics, 2007, author’s 
calculations) 
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5.2 Background and frame 
5.2.1 Changes in structure of the Jewish society in Israel 
Israel is a deeply divided society where the most prominent social distinctions, 
beside the national Arab-Jewish split, are between religious and secular groups, 
between immigrants and the rest of the Israelis, and among various ethnic 
groups (Smooha, 2004, 2005). Religiosity and ethnicity explain the 
differentiation in ways of life, cultural consumption, political choices and 
family behavior (Friedlander and Feldmann, 1993; Katz-Gerro, Raz and Yaish, 
2009; Shamir and Arian, 1999). During the last three decades, religious 
observance became the most noticeable social distinction in Israel, while 
ethnicity and socio-economic factors have substantially reduced their 
explanatory power for family behavior (DellaPergola, 2009; Friedlander, 2002).  
 
Ethnicity, nonetheless, has received particular attention since a sizeable mass of 
the population from the former Soviet Union (FSU) entered Israel during the 
nineties. This mass migration has posed another reason as to why the conflict 
over civil marriage has been refueled. Firstly, the secular orientation of the 
majority of FSU immigrants posed difficulties for them to accept the fact that 
the state allows the Orthodox to dominate in regulating personal matters. 
Religious family law was described as obscure, ancient and peculiar, and seen 
as ‘unacceptable for most reasonable people in the twenty-first century’ 
(Remennick, 2007: 64). Secondly, among the approximately one million 
newcomers who arrived since 1989 a few hundred thousands are excluded by 
the religious personal law. These people are not eligible to marry within the 
Jewish community because they are defined as non-Jewish according to the 
Orthodox doctrine. In order to marry in Jewish Orthodox ceremony, both 
parties must be recognized as being Jewish. 
 
 In 2010, the option of spousal registry was introduced by the parliament only 
for cases in which both parties are defined as ‘being of no religion’ and who 
cannot marry within any religious community in Israel (The Knesset, The 
Israeli Parliament, 2011). However, this legislation solves the problem of 
marrying in a civil ceremony for a very limited number of people: in 2000-2006 
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approximately four percent of all marriages of Jewish Israelis performed abroad 
were such cases (Israel Central Bureau of Statistics, 2007, author’s 
calculations). Some couples of mixed religious affiliation still cannot legally 
marry without a religious conversion. This state of affairs is regarded as highly 
problematic from the human rights point of view, since it is incompatible with 
the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion (Merin, 2004).  
 
Personal law has been seen as acting against freedom of conscience, also for the 
rest of secular public and not just 1990s immigrants (Liebman and Don-Yehiya, 
1983, 1984; Gavison, 2003). Shortly before this migration began, social 
covenants as one expression of civic actions arose following the ideological 
crisis and the inability of the political system to settle the religious-secular 
conflict (Cohen and Rynhold, 2005). The Gavison–Medan Covenant constitutes 
one of the most comprehensive public attempts to abolish the religious 
monopoly over the regulation of personal status (Artsieli, 2004). The various 
bottom-up and top-down initiatives, including those of the Supreme Court, the 
left parties and Israeli academia, indicate that public awareness of the acuteness 
of the problem has sharpened. It seems that the social schisms have not 
disappeared over time; they have divided the society further apart.  
 
5.2.2 Theoretical considerations and the current research 
The rising aspirations and individualism in the West have increased the demand 
for personal autonomy. Political institutions have also been subject to this 
emancipative value change, which emphasizes freedom of choice for 
individuals, tolerant attitudes towards the other and liberalism. The Human 
Empowerment Model (Welzel and Inglehart, 2008; Welzel, Inglehart and 
Klingemann, 2003) builds on three basic pillars – (1) availability of action 
resources, such as individual material and cognitive resources, skills and 
connectivity; (2) growing emphasis on self-expression values that motivate 
people to govern their lives; and (3) effective democratic regime that 
institutionalizes legal rights, thus allowing for civil and political liberties and 
choice. Human empowerment implies that the authoritarian rule can no longer 
be acceptable (Inglehart and Welzel, 2005, 2010). 
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The changing worldviews of Israelis follow the western pattern (Smooha, 2005; 
Yuchtman-Ya’ar, 2002). Nevertheless, an absence of the institution of civil 
marriage in Israel poses a serious structural constraint on the path of human 
empowerment. It might strongly impede the Second Demographic Transition 
(SDT) (Lesthaeghe and van de Kaa, 1986). SDT refers to change in marital and 
childbearing behaviors along with value orientation. Therefore, the theoretical 
expectation that family preferences and behavior would alter following changes 
in values might not be fully realized in Israel. 
 
The current research aims at answering the following questions: has there been 
a shift over time in attitudes toward civil marriage in Israel? Is there an inter-
generational change in attitudes toward civil marriage? The first two hypotheses 
are that the support of civil marriage in Israel increases over time, and that the 
younger generations are more tolerant of the idea of instituting civil marriage in 
Israel than the older. These hypotheses are derived from the notion that western 
value orientation has been partially shown in Israel, primarily in regards to 
preference of values of self-expression and quality of life as opposed to 
materialistic values (Yuchtman-Ya’ar, 2002). Increasing liberal attitudes toward 
sexual norms and cohabitation (Katz, 2001) suggest that a more liberal 
standpoint might evolve over time in regards to civil marriage as well, despite 
the concerns of national pride and traditions.  
 
Opposite views toward civil marriage might also evolve as a result of existing 
national sentiments (Anson and Meir, 1996), persisting familism (Fogiel-
Bijaoui, 2002; Smooha, 2005), and traditionalism of the society in regards to 
gender roles and division of labor (Fogiel-Bijaoui, 2002; Stier and Lewin-
Epstein, 2000). Hence, another question of interest for current research is which 
factors explain restrictive attitudes to civil marriage?  
 
The third hypothesis is that religiosity and the degree of identification with the 
nation is strongly connected to attitudes towards civil marriage. Shamir and 
Arian (1999) suggest that the collective Jewish identity in Israel involves two 
dimensions: the external dimension operates through concepts of the land (or 
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territories), the borders and the relations with the Palestinians. The internal 
dimension links the issues of Jewish religion, nation and citizenship. These 
national identity dimensions were found to be strongly predictive of electoral 
behavior and political choice. That is, religiosity, low education, lower socio-
economic status and an Asian-African ethnic background were closely 
associated with right-wing voting. Religious observance had the strongest effect 
among all other socio-demographic predictors. Moreover, attitudes to the 
territories became an increasingly important determinant of voting between the 
seventies and mid-nineties (Shamir and Shamir, 2008).  
 
As to external identity, the narrative of the biblical ‘promised land’ connects the 
Jewish nation and the land, where the State of Israel is currently located (Yuval-
Davis, 1980). Jewish settlements on the territories of Judea and Samaria, which 
are allegedly part of the ‘promised land’, are viewed by the religious 
nationalists as fulfillment of God’s will. Bloc of the Faithful, Gush Emunim, 
advocated and implemented the governmental policy of settling in Judea and 
Samaria from the seventies onwards, and saw itself as the successor of the early 
Zionist movement (Strum, 1989).  
 
As to internal identity, the idea of preserving the nation via control over 
personal matters has been repeatedly discussed in the literature and given 
various interpretations. For instance, according to Yuval-Davis (1980), the 
personal law is meant to directly define the national collective: “Controlling 
women and their familial status, therefore, is of a crucial importance to the 
Zionist movement which gives the utmost importance to reproducing the 
national boundaries of the Jewish people, in and outside Israel” (Yuval-Davis, 
1980: 21). Fogiel-Bijauoi (2003) argues that the personal law in Israel serves 
nationalistic interests of preventing mixed marriages by legally separating 
between ‘them’ and ‘us’. These socio-cultural explanations suggest that the 
collective national identity of the Jewish Israelis does not allow for free choice 
when individuals face the institution of marriage. 
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5.3 Data and methods 
In the first stage, changes in attitudes to civil marriage in Israel over time are 
analyzed using univariate ANOVA and ANCOVA. Social Survey 2009 of the 
Israel Central Bureau of Statistics
24
, the Guttman Center
25
 surveys (Elections 
Survey, 1969
26
 and Weekly Survey, 1993
27
) and AVI CHAI surveys
28
 (1991
29
, 
1999
30
) are used as the data sources. The samples in The Guttman Center 
surveys were set as representative of the Jewish adult population in Israel, and 
the sample in the Social Survey 2009 as representative of the total adult 
population in Israel. The Arab population was not analyzed in the current 
research. 
 
The dependent variable in the current study is based on the item ‘It should be 
made possible to conduct civil marriage in Israel for those who are interested in 
it’ (1991, 1993, 1999, 2009). In 1969 the wording slightly differed; it read ‘Do 
you agree that the laws of marriage/divorce remain under Rabbinate's exclusive 
jurisdiction?’. Therefore, some degree of caution is required while interpreting 
the results. The answers were coded on a Likert scale from 1 ‘totally agree’ to 4 
‘totally disagree’ in 1969 and 2009; and on a scale from 1 ‘definitely should’ to 
6 ‘definitely should not’ in 1991, 1993 and 1999. The data were compiled in a 
single set. The dependent variable was subject to recoding and linear 
                                                   
24
 Data obtained from Israel Social Data Center (ISDC) at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, 
Israel. Social Survey was conducted between January and December 2009 in Hebrew, Arabic 
and Russian among individuals aged 20 and over; computer-assisted personal interviews; 
response rate 79.9%. For detailed description of the Social Survey background, methods and 
sampling see http://surveys.cbs.gov.il/Survey/EngHelpTexts/Help2009.htm 
25
 Former Israel Institute of Applied Social Research. Data obtained from the Guttman Center 
of The Israel Democracy Institute 
(www.idi.org.il/sites/english/TheGuttmanCenterSurveys/Pages/TheGuttmanCenter.aspx) 
26 
Election Survey (data file G0305 August) was conducted in August 1969, in Hebrew, among 
Jewish population above 18 years old; response rates are non-available 
27
 Weekly Survey (file G1064 February 266) was conducted in February 1993, in Hebrew, 
among Jewish population above 20 years old; telephone survey; response rates are non-
available 
28 
For detailed description of background, methods and sampling of AVI CHAI surveys 1991 
and 1999, conducted by the Guttman Center, see Levy, Levinsohn and Katz (1997, 2000)  
29 
AVI CHAI survey 1991 was conducted between 20 October and 16
 
December 1991 in 
Hebrew, among Jewish population above 20 years old; face to face interviews; reported 
response rate 95% 
30 
AVI CHAI survey 1999 was conducted between June 1999 and September 1999 in Hebrew 
and Russian, among Jewish population above 20 years old; face to face interviews; reported 
response rate 95% 
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transformation, such that eight categories of answers were obtained, ranging 
from 0 ‘totally disagree’ to 1 ‘totally agree’.  
 
The second stage of the research implemented OLS regression modeling in 
order to show which factors explain permissive attitudes to marriage. The level 
of observance of Jewish religious tradition and self-definition of religious 
identity are the standard measures of religiosity in Israel (Arian, Ventura and 
Philippov, 2008). The religious identity measure highly correlates with the level 
of observance of the Jewish religious tradition Pearsonr =0.69 in the Social Survey 
2009 of the Israel Central Bureau of Statistics and 
Pearsonr =0.75 in the 
Democracy Survey
31
 2009 of the Guttman Center. These two cross-sectional 
survey data sets were analyzed separately. The sample of each survey contains 
sixteen percent of 1990s immigrants, which accurately correspond to their share 
in population. The phrasing of the dependent variable in the latter reads 
‘couples should be allowed to marry in any way they choose’.  
 
The independent variables were grouped by socio-demographic characteristics 
(which were available in both data sets), traditional attitudes (available in the 
Social Survey 2009) and nationalistic attitudes and identification with the 
nation (available in the Democracy Survey 2009 data). Socio-demographic 
characteristics included gender, age (by five-year age groups), ethnicity 
(respondent born Israel, born FSU, born Europe-America and born Asia-
Africa), religiosity (secular, traditional non-religious, traditional religious, 
religious, and Ultra-Orthodox
32
), education (below 11 years of schooling, 11-
12, 13-15 and above 16) and socio-economic status (per capita income below 
2,000 NIS; 2,001-4,000 NIS; and above 4,000 NIS
33
).  
 
                                                   
31 
Democracy Survey was conducted in March 2009, in Hebrew, Arabic and Russian, among 
individuals aged 20 and over; landline telephone survey; response rate around 40%. For detailed 
description of background, methods and sampling see Arian, Philippov and Knafelman (2009) 
32
 These five categories of religious identity measure were defined by the Israel Central Bureau 
of Statistics. In the Guttman Center, four categories are used. For more details see Arian, 
Ventura and Philippov (2008) 
33
 NIS refers to the New Israeli Shekel which was equal to approximately 0.20€ or 0.28 US$ in 
January 2011 
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Traditional outlook was assessed by the degree of agreement with the statement 
‘a couple who wants children must be married’ on a Likert scale of 4 (recoded 
into dichotomous variable), ideal number of children in a family in the 
respondent’s opinion and the actual number of births (only answers of women 
were analyzed for the latter item) (data of Social Survey, 2009).  
 
Nationalistic outlook was assessed by the following five interconnected items
34
: 
(1) right-wing political orientation (measured originally on a Likert 7-point 
scale and recoded into three categories – left, center and right); (2) standpoint 
regarding withdrawal from the territories of Judea and Samaria as a part of the 
agreements with the Palestinians (‘not withdraw under any circumstances’, 
‘agree to withdraw from small and isolated settlements’ and ‘agree to withdraw 
from all settlements including big conglomerates’); (3) a question: ‘would you 
support giving the Arab neighbourhoods of Jerusalem to Palestinians as a part 
of the agreements?’ (measured on a Likert scale of four categories); (4) a 
statement ‘the government should encourage Arab emigration from 
Israel’(measured on a Likert scale of four categories); (5) a degree of agreement 
with the statement ‘Israeli Arabs should be denied the right to vote and be 
elected to the parliament’ on a Likert scale of five categories (data of the 
Democracy Survey, 2009). These items might represent the external national 
identity, following the terminology used in Shamir and Arian (1999). 
 
Identification with the nation was assessed by the following three items: ‘would 
you like to live in Israel in the long term?’, ‘would you agree that one of your 
family members marries a non-Jewish American citizen?’ and ‘would you agree 
that one of your family members marries non-Jewish immigrant from the 
former USSR?’ (The Democracy Survey, 2009). These items represent the 
internal national identity, following Shamir and Arian (1999) definitions, while 
the first construct the Israeli identity as primary and the latter ones construct the 
Jewish identity as primary.  
  
                                                   
34
  The internal consistency measure, Alpha-Cronbach is  =0.71 (N=698) 
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5.4 Results 
5.4.1 Attitudes toward instituting civil marriage in Israel 
During the last four decades, the public was asked repeatedly for its opinion on 
instituting civil marriage in Israel. Thus, shifts in attitudes toward civil marriage 
can be observed. Generalization to a total adult Jewish population can be made 
since the samples were considered to be representative. Table 9 presents the 
change in attitudes toward civil marriage in 1969-2009. 
 
Two trends can be distinguished: between 1969 and 1999 the attitudes toward 
civil marriage became more favourable. Each religious group changed attitudes 
in favour of the civil option. Even the respondents who completely observe 
religious tradition regarded the civil option slightly more positively. The total 
Jewish population became more tolerant over time towards the idea of the 
introduction of the civil option on the marriage market. However, between 1999 
and 2009 another intriguing trend appeared: although in each group the 
attitudes continued shifting in the direction of favouring civil marriage, the total 
support did not build up anymore and even declined by two percentage points.  
 
Table 9: Percentage of agreement to institute civil marriage in Israel 
among the Jewish population in 1969-2009  
 
Percentage of agreementª to institute civil marriage in Israel 
Source The Guttman Center Social 
Survey 
Year 1969 1991 1993 1999 2009 
Level of observance of 
the Jewish religious 
tradition  
Non-observant 82 
N=85 
89 
N=247 
89 
N=270 
94 
N=1,280 
95 
N=386 
Partially observant 42 
N=191 
61 
N=506 
60 
N=565 
78 
N=2,512 
88 
N=1,870 
Very observant 20 
N=41 
26 
N=278 
25 
N=216 
38 
N=1,054 
62 
N=2,224 
Completely observant 5 
N=55 
8 
N=160 
6 
N=129 
15 
N=788 
23 
N=1,452 
Total Jewish 
population 
43 
N=372 
51 
N=1,200 
54 
N=1,180 
 
65 
N=5,710 
63 
N=5,932 
Source: calculated from the Guttman Center surveys (1969, 1991, 1993, 1999); Social Survey 
2009 ª Hereafter ‘agree’ includes ‘strongly agree’ and ’agree’ where the answers were on a 4 
point scale and ‘definitely should’, ‘should’ and ‘perhaps should’ where the answers were given 
on a 6 point scale  
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These results support only partially the research hypothesis that there is a 
growing tolerance of the institute of civil marriage in Israel over time. In the 
first decade of the new millennium, the trend has changed, and the mean 
support was leveled off. Apparently, the proportion of individuals who hold an 
extreme negative view on civil marriage rose in the total population in 2009 in 
such dramatic way that stagnation took place. The argument in this paper is that 
the stagnating effect is due to the changing composition of the population, 
which has experienced two major developments during the last two decades: 
mass immigration from the FSU and high growth of the most religious group. 
The opposite effects of these two demographic phenomena are assessed 
separately. Firstly, the negative impact of the most religious on total support of 
civil marriage is discussed.  
 
The increasing weight of the most religious groups (who hold the most 
unfavourable attitude toward civil marriage) in total population has neutralized 
the more favourable attitudes of less religious in 2009. The increasing weight of 
the most religious group stems from the extremely high birth rate. The total 
fertility of the Ultra Orthodox comprises 7.00 children per woman (Friedlander, 
2002). The annual growth rate of 6-7% among the Ultra-Orthodox core 
(Gurovich and Cohen-Kastro, 2004) means that this radically religious 
population doubles itself approximately every 13 years (Bystrov and Soffer, 
2012). The effects of this tremendous growth on population composition have 
been demonstrated in demographic research literature (Bystrov, 2012a; 
Friedlander and Feldmann, 1993; Friedlander, 2002; Gurovich and Cohen-
Kastro, 2004). These population composition effects indicate that the structure 
of the Jewish society in Israel has been rapidly changing. 
 
Exponential growth of the Ultra-Orthodox population is seen in Figure 14. 
Since the proportion of births that occur among the Ultra-Orthodox core has 
been much higher than among other groups, the share of very religious 
individuals among the younger cohorts is considerably higher than among the 
older. These figures indicate that the most religious group significantly 
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influences the population structure in Israel. This fundamental change in 
population structure leads to long term consequences. 
 
Figure 14: Percentage of the Ultra-Orthodox in the total Jewish population 
by age groups in 2002-2009  
 
Source: calculated from the Social Survey (2002, 2005, 2009)  
 
Analysis of variance, which explains about thirty-five percent of variance in 
support of civil marriage ( 2R =0.35) among Jews in Israel in 1969-2009, 
produces a similar picture: the most religiously observant groups hold most 
negative attitudes towards civil marriage, while the non-observant group holds 
the most positive attitude. While the score 0 indicates total disagreement to 
introduce civil marriage and 1 total agreement, the mean score of non-observant 
Jews was M=0.85 (standard deviation SD=0.24; N=2,268), partially observant 
M=0.69 (SD=0.33; N=5,643), very observant M=0.45 (SD=0.37; N=3,815) and 
completely observant M=0.19 (SD=0.31; N=2,583). These differences in 
attitudes by religious definition are of the highest explanatory power ( 280,14/1F
=7057.58, partial 
2 =0.33, p<0.001), controlling for year of survey, age and 
1990s migrational background. Therefore, as the population of Israel is 
composed of a continuously growing proportion of religious and Ultra-
Orthodox, the attitudes become less liberal in total.  
 
As for the impact of the 1990s immigration on support of civil marriage: in 
analysis of variance, controlling for year of survey, age and religious 
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observance, the immigrants were found more supportive of the idea of 
instituting civil marriage than the rest of Jews (
280,14/1F =44.17, partial 
2
=0.003, p<0.001). Mean score among the immigrants comprised M=0.78 
(SD=0.29; N=1,147) and among the rest of Jews M=0.54 (SD=0.39; 
N=13,162). Interestingly, an interaction effect between age and immigration 
was found significant in this model (
280,14/12F =2.32, partial 
2 =0.002, p<0.01). 
In other words, attitudes to civil marriage of younger immigrants compared to 
the older differed from their counterparts among the rest of Jews. Older 
immigrants showed more supportive attitudes to civil marriage than the 
younger. For the rest of Jews, the picture was reversed: the older were less 
supportive. The main effect of age was also found to be significant but rather 
weak (
280,14/13F =1.95, partial 
2 =0.002, p<0.05), with the younger being more 
supportive for civil marriage than the older.  
 
The interaction effect can be explained by the socialization processes of the 
young immigrants which took place at least to some extent – if not fully – in 
Israel, whereas the socialization of the older immigrants took place in a secular 
state – the former Soviet Union. As a result, the worldviews of the young 
immigrants tended to converge with those of the local youth. The gap in 
worldviews of the older immigrants, compared to their local counterparts, 
remained much wider.  
 
Polynomial linear contrast estimates show how much of the support towards 
civil marriage is explained by the individuals’ religious observance compared to 
1990s migrational background, taking into account the change in attitudes over 
time. The impact of the passing time explains, surprisingly, only about one 
percent of variance (p<0.001). The impact of 1990s migrational background 
adds another 2.5 percentage points to the explanatory power (p<0.001). Age of 
respondents has been found to have negligible explanatory power. The greatest 
impact on support of civil marriage is that of religious observance: it explains 
up to approximately thirty one percent of variance alone and up to 
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approximately thirty five together with other factors (the passing time, age and 
1990s immigration) (p<0.001).  
 
Table 10 shows how the population composition effects come about. 
Controlling the data by the 1990s migrational background and the level of 
religiosity of the respondents, allows for estimating the marginal contribution of 
each of these demographic factors over time to overall change in attitudes. 
From Table 10, one can directly estimate the size of effects of the 1990s 
immigration and the religious growth on the total outlook of the society in the 
following manner: the score one in agreement to introduce civil marriage can be 
regarded as hundred percent of support, and score zero as null support. 
Therefore, estimated mean support of civil marriage without 1990s immigrants, 
compared to observed mean support, shows that immigrants have actually 
increased the support of civil marriage by approximately one percentage point 
in 1999, and by four percentage points in 2009 (difference between the third 
column and the fourth).  
 
Table 10: Mean support of civil marriage in 1969-2009 (0 indicates total 
disagreement to introduce civil marriage; 1 indicates total agreement)  
Year N Observed 
mean 
score of 
support  
Estimated 
marginal 
means 
corrected 
for 1990s 
immigration
ª 
 
Estimated 
marginal 
means 
corrected 
for religious 
observance 
 
Estimated 
marginal 
means 
corrected 
for religious 
observance 
and 1990s 
immigration  
Estimated 
marginal 
means 
corrected for 
religious 
observance, 
1990s 
immigration 
and age 
(mean) 
1969 372 0.435 0.435 0.434 0.434 0.430 
1991 1,200 0.484 0.484 0.512 0.512 0.510 
1993 1,180 0.508 0.508 0.506 0.506 0.506 
1999 5,710 0.598 0.584 0.614 0.609 0.608 
2009 5,949 0.561 0.529 0.714 0.702 0.704 
ª Estimations corrected for 1990s immigration in the table were calculated for zero immigration. 
Estimations corrected for religious observance were calculated for mean score of religious 
observance of 1969 (M=2.82). Estimations corrected for age were calculated for mean age of 
respondents (M=43.92) 
Source: calculated from the compiled data set of Guttman Center surveys (1969, 1991, 1993, 
1999) and the Social Survey 2009  
  
 113 
In the same manner, if the different weight of the religious in the total 
population is controlled by keeping the mean religious observance on the base 
level of 1969, the difference between the observed and estimated support rises 
from approximately two percentage points in 1999 up to approximately fifteen 
percentage points in 2009 (difference between the third column and the fifth). 
In other words, during the last decade, the change in population composition 
due to the religious growth accounts for around thirteen percentage points in 
(non-)support of civil marriage.  
 
5.4.2 Determinants of permissive attitudes toward marriage  
As the previous section shows, support of civil marriage in Israel generally 
decreases with age, religiousness, and increases if the respondent is an 
immigrant of the 1990s from the FSU. For the FSU immigrants an opposite 
impact of age was found compared to the rest of population – the support of 
civil marriage increased with age. These attitudinal trends correspond to the 
behavioral patterns that were found in a recent study on marriage of Israelis 
abroad: older age at marriage, higher socio-economic cluster, being an 
immigrant from the FSU of the 1990s, and being previously married were 
significant predictors of the likelihood of Israeli citizens to marry abroad 
(Dovrin, 2006).  
 
The results of the OLS regression analyses in Tables 11-13 indicate that the 
socio-demographic variables (age, migration from the FSU of the 1990s, 
education, income and religious identity) serve as strong predictors of attitudes 
toward civil marriage. These socio-demographic factors explain cumulatively 
up to forty-five percent of variance in attitudes (Table 3). Religious identity 
alone explains 39 percent of the variance, while ethnicity alone explains nine 
percent (N=4,551). No doubt, religiosity in Israel is the most powerful social 
determinant, as previous studies have shown (Shamir and Arian, 1999; 
Friedlander, 1993, 2002). Ethnicity was also found to be an important 
determinant, especially the recent migrational background from the FSU. 
Asian-African ethnic origin was found a significant predictor too. 
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Table 11: OLS regression modelsª of support of civil marriage by socio-
demographic variables and traditionalism (figures are unstandardized Beta-
coefficients; dependent variable: degree of agreement with the statement ‘it should be made 
possible to conduct civil marriage in Israel for those who are interested in it’ on a 4-point Likert 
scale when ‘totally agree’=1; ‘totally disagree’=0) 
 
Model (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
35
 
N 4,551 4,551 4,551 4,551 4,551 2,519 
2R  0.09 0.17 0.43 0.47 0.44 0.48 
Constant 0.32*** 0.33*** 0.68*** 0.77*** 0.73*** 0.65*** 
Gender (ref. male) 0.05*** 0.04*** 0.01 0.00 0.01 - 
Years of schooling (ref. 1-10)       
11-12 0.07** 0.03 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.03 
13-15 0.13*** 0.07*** 0.08*** 0.06*** 0.07*** 0.07** 
above 16 0.18*** 0.11*** 0.12*** 0.10** 0.12*** 0.14*** 
Per capita income (ref. below 
2,000 NIS) 
      
2,001-4,000 NIS 0.12*** 0.11*** 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 
above 4,000 NIS 0.21*** 0.22*** 0.40** 0.02* 0.03** 0.04** 
Ethnicity (ref.  born Israel)       
born FSU
36
  0.24*** 0.10*** 0.12*** 0.08*** 0.10*** 
born Asia-Africa  -0.19*** -0.09*** -0.08*** -0.08*** -0.08*** 
born Europe-America  0.02 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.02 
Religious identity (ref. secular)       
traditional non-religious   -0.21*** -0.17*** -0.20*** -0.19*** 
traditional-religious   -0.38*** -0.33*** -0.36*** -0.34*** 
religious   -0.55*** -0.47*** -0.50*** -0.55*** 
Ultra-Orthodox   -0.73*** -0.63*** -0.62*** -0.68*** 
Agree that ‘a couple who wants 
children must be married’  
   -0.17***   
Ideal number of children
37 
(ref. 
2) 
      
0-1     0.01  
3     -0.04**  
4     -0.07***  
5     -0.11***  
6     -0.14***  
7-9     -0.18***  
10-21     -0.16***  
Number of births the respondent 
has given  
 
     -0.02*** 
ª All models control for age; Sig. ***p≤0.001 **p≤0.05 *p≤0.1; Source: Social Survey 2009  
 
 
Two additional groups of variables explain attitudes toward civil marriage after 
controlling for socio-demographic variables: traditional family values and 
behavior, and political attitudes. The support of civil marriage decreases if 
                                                   
35
 Only women were included in this model 
36 
This category includes only immigrants of the 1990s from the FSU; respondents born in the 
FSU who migrated earlier are included in the category of born Europe-America  
37
 The first two categories were merged because of a very small N: only two respondents chose 
0 as an ideal number of children and nineteen respondents chose 1  
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respondents agree that ‘a couple who wants children must be married’, if the 
reported ideal number of children is higher than three and as a number of given 
births rises. Hence, traditional outlook is a separate determinant from 
religiosity, of non-liberal attitudes toward civil marriage, and contributes up to 
additional five percentage points to overall explained variance.  
 
Table 12: OLS regression models of permissive attitude toward marriage 
by nationalistic outlook (figures are unstandardized Beta-coefficients; dependent 
variable: degree of agreement with the statement ‘couples should be allowed to marry in any 
way they choose’ on a 4-point Likert scale when ‘totally agree’=1; ‘totally disagree’=0) 
 
Model (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
N 678 678 678 678 678 678 
2R  0.33 0.35 0.35 0.34 0.33 0.34 
Constant 0.83*** 0.80*** 0.91*** 0.79*** 0.79*** 0.74*** 
       
Political orientationª (ref. 
center) 
      
left-wing  0.10**     
right-wing  -0.07**     
Attitude as to the territories of 
Judea and Samaria (ref. 
withdraw totally) 
      
not withdraw   -0.14***    
withdraw partially   -0.06    
Agree to give the Arab 
neighbourhoods of 
Jerusalem to the 
Palestinians 
   0.02   
Disagree that the government 
should encourage Arab 
emigration from Israel 
    0.02  
Israeli Arabs should not be 
denied the right to vote and 
be elected to the parliament  
     
0.02** 
Notes: all models control for socio-demographic variables (gender, age, ethnicity, religiosity, 
years of schooling and socio-economic status which is measured here by family expenditures 
compared to Israeli average); Sig. ***p≤0.001 **p≤0.05 *p≤0.1; Source: The Democracy 
Survey 2009. ª Political orientation was measured on Likert scale from 1 to 7; right-wing 
orientation includes categories 1-2 (N=206), center 3-4 (N=344) and  left-wing 5-7 (N=148)  
 
 
Certain worldviews related to politics, land and nation also explain non-liberal 
attitudes toward marriage. Radically nationalistic outlook and hostile attitude 
towards the Arab minority was held in 2009 by up to a third of Jewish Israelis. 
However, in questions of land and territories, the nationalistic outlook was 
supported by a much larger proportion of respondents. For example, forty five 
percent stated that Israel should not withdraw from the territories of Judea and 
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Samaria under any circumstances. Sixty percent objected to give the 
Palestinians the Arab neighbourhoods of Jerusalem as part of the agreements.  
 
Table 13: OLS regression models of permissive attitude toward marriage 
by identification with the nation (figures are unstandardized Beta-coefficients; 
dependent variable: degree of agreement with the statement ‘couples should be allowed to 
marry in any way they choose’ on a 4-point Likert scale when ‘totally agree’=1; ‘totally 
disagree’=0) 
Model (1) (2 (3) (4) 
N 788 788 356 404 
2R  0.33 0.34 0.40 0.36 
Constant 0.84*** 0.81*** 0.75*** 0.74*** 
     
Wish to live in Israel in the long-term (ref. 
yes) 
    
doubt  0.08**   
no  0.02   
Agree that a family member marries a non-
Jewish American 
  0.15***  
Agree that a family member marries a non-
Jewish FSU immigrant 
   0.19*** 
Notes: all models control for socio-demographic variables. Sig. ***p≤0.001 **p≤0.05 *p≤0.1; 
Source: The Democracy Survey 2009. 
 
As to the issue of intermarriage between Jews and non-Jews from the FSU or 
the United States: about two-thirds of Jewish Israelis would not support their 
family member marrying a non-Jew of either origin. Among the 1990s 
immigrants, about a quarter did not support such intermarriage (data of the 
Democracy Survey, 2009). In fact, nationalistic worldviews in Israel appear 
quite frequently among the masses.  
 
The following series of findings (Tables 12-13) indicate that the liberal attitude 
toward marriage: 
 decreases if the respondent’s political orientation is right-wing and 
increases if it is left-wing  
 decreases if the respondent objects to withdrawal from Judea and Samaria 
as a part of the agreements with the Palestinians  
 increases if the respondent disagrees that the Arabs should be denied the 
right to vote and be elected in the parliament 
 increases if the respondent doubts about living in Israel in the long term  
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 increases if the respondent agrees to an inter-religious marriage in his/her 
own family, i.e. that a family member marries a non-Jewish American 
citizen or a non-Jewish immigrant from the FSU  
 
 
5.5 Conclusions and summary 
This chapter has discussed two main points: firstly, the effects of changing 
population composition in the medium and long term have a substantial impact 
on the societal outlook. Population composition in Israel changed dramatically 
due to mass immigration from the FSU during the last two decades and due to 
the extremely high growth rate of the Ultra-Orthodox. The immigration has 
strengthened the camp of supporters of instituting civil marriage in the host 
society. The growing weight of the Ultra-Orthodox has leveled off the support 
to civil marriage. 
 
 Secondly, nationalistic and traditional outlook, though highly correlate with the 
level of religiosity, constitute autonomous explanatory factors. These findings 
are of critical importance since they shed light on the worldviews and value 
orientations of people who object to the liberalization of the institution of 
marriage.  
 
Though both demographic factors of the secular immigration and the fertility of 
the religious have altered the population composition, the influence of 
immigration on the policy regarding civil marriage has proven to be limited. 
According to Lazerwitz and Tabory (2002), societal religious surroundings 
affect even the most secular people in Israel. The converging worldviews of the 
young immigrants with those of the local youth, which have been shown, might 
be a consequence of such social influence. 
 
Another reason might be the civic passiveness among the FSU immigrants, 
which has been shown by Philippov and Bystrov (2011). Despite the substantial 
electoral power of nineteen seats in the parliament (out of one hundred and 
twenty) (Philippov, 2007), the FSU immigrant community has failed to force 
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the Israeli political system to act in their interests. Civic passiveness might 
explain why the immigrants have been reluctant to stand for their civic rights.  
 
The implications of the situation regarding marriage and divorce in Israel for 
the progression of the Second Demographic Transition might be of interest to 
scholars of socio-demographic research. The institutional structural constraint 
on the marriage arena is a unique feature of Israel compared to European 
countries that have experienced this transition since the seventies. How does 
this constraint affect the family formation and marriage dissolution patterns in 
Israel? How will the absence of civil marriage affect the trends in cohabitation 
and alternative living arrangements in the future? How does this constraint 
affect the formation of worldviews regarding family among the young, who 
grow up in a high income and knowledge society? These questions remain open 
for future research. 
 
The shortcomings of the religious legislation and the growing political strength 
of the religious parties suggest that Israel might move away from the liberal and 
egalitarian model of state-religion relationship (Neuberger, 1999). The direction 
of development in a country such as Israel is not linear. Liberalizing attitudes 
and the adoption of emancipative values have failed so far in creating enough 
pressure on the legislative system to constitute civil marriage in Israel. 
Therefore, even if people are willing to govern their private lives, the 
institutional background is still not ready. In order for the Human 
Empowerment Model to work in Israel, the lacking element of an empowering 
regime is urgently needed. But even if this institutional component is suddenly 
available, the time until the motivational component runs out is up to the 
population composition, and thus, very limited. 
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6. General discussion and conclusions 
The goal of this dissertation was to examine several aspects of the demographic 
and social change within the conceptual framework of the SDT theory. It was 
argued that focusing on a single case study is beneficial for analyzing the 
underlying mechanisms and studying the transition as an integrated process. 
Case study approach creates insights into the causes and the consequences of 
the demographic transition, which is interconnected with broader cultural and 
economic changes within a context. Such in-depth inquiry also reveals the 
issues at stake from the individual point of view, which are often missing in 
many studies of demographic changes. It also discloses some information about 
the factors that might hamper the onset and slow the progression of the SDT.  
 
In order to meet this goal, several studies were conducted. Each of them aimed 
at analyzing a particular aspect of the overarching research problem. The first 
study, described in Chapter 2, aimed at gathering some empirical evidence to 
the basic premise of the SDT theory that the ideational shift was the one that 
fueled the behavioural change and not vice versa. Chapter 3 was designed to 
provide a general overview of the transition process in a single country, Israel, 
which served as a case study of the SDT, and provide an initial clue of what are 
the main issues concerning the progression of the SDT there.  
 
Chapters 4 and 5 analyze the factors behind two of the most outstanding 
phenomena that distinguish Israel from other high income democracies: high 
fertility and the absence of the institute of civil marriage. Both of these 
phenomena are directly connected to the SDT. Having the highest fertility 
levels in the developed world, Israel proves to be an outlier in one of the most 
noticeable features of demographic behaviour. In the marriage domain, Israel is 
a unique case in the developed world as well: not only the institute of civil 
marriage is absent there, but the overall attitudes towards instituting civil 
marriage in the country are also quite restrictive. These two phenomena are 
specific to Israel, and represent those contextual, path-dependent and historical 
peculiarities that are frequently referred to in cross-national research as 
unexplained variation at the country level.  
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6.1 Summary and discussion of the main findings 
Firstly, emancipative value change in the last three decades was shown to be the 
most important determinant of massive postponement of marriage across the 
globe, compared with economic development and increase in women’s 
education. Although some feedback mechanism was found in relations between 
human empowerment and marital postponement, these findings support the 
SDT theoretical premises. They offer a preliminary confirmation at the macro 
level that marital transition is likely to occur in open societies that cherish free 
choice and equal opportunities for individuals. When these become important 
societal values, other family related attitudinal and behavioural changes are 
likely to occur.  
 
Secondly, it was shown that in the past two decades most of the Jewish 
population in Israel experienced value change in parallel to marital and fertility 
transitions. Using the Israeli example, it was demonstrated that the demographic 
transition goes hand in hand with the transition toward post-modernity. 
Although there is no one path of the SDT that all societies must walk, in most 
post-transitional countries some core features are likely to be found. In this 
respect Israel is not an exception: value change seems to be a pre-requisite to 
behavioural change.  
 
At the same time, it was shown that Israeli society is highly heterogeneous in 
the scope and timing of approaching the SDT. A clear connection was found 
between the level of religiosity and the progression of the SDT. Some religious 
groups, such as the Moslem minority and the Ultra-Orthodox Jews do not 
approach the SDT thresholds, neither in value orientation, nor in family related 
behaviours. It was concluded that SDT in Israel unfolds in a non-uniform 
manner. 
 
Moreover, some SDT related behaviours were found to be specific to Israel. 
Upbringing children, for instance, was shown to be a very strong societal value, 
manifested at the behavioural level as well. Among some population groups this 
manifestation has been taken to an extreme degree. Evidently, some societal 
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groups have never completed even the first demographic transition in regards to 
fertility. Comparison with European countries also demonstrated that Israel 
differs tremendously in regards to fertility profiles. High fertility in Israel was 
argued to be the trend of the past, present and future.  
 
Thirdly, unequivocal evidence of religiosity being the most prominent 
determinant of fertility compared to other factors at the individual level was 
presented. Although a strong connection at the individual level between 
nationalistic attitudes and high level of religiosity was found, the alternative 
explanation of nationalism as a determinant of fertility did not find any further 
support. This finding contrasts the previously found connection at the aggregate 
level between nationalist sentiments and fertility (Anson and Meir 1996). 
Structural equation modeling showed that nationalism was mediated by 
religiosity, but not the opposite, as was previously claimed.  
 
Finally, it was shown that Israeli marital transition takes place within conditions 
which significantly differ from those in developed countries. In the developed 
world, Israel is the only country where religious institutions are granted 
exclusivity in conducting marriage and divorce. Therefore, the absence of the 
civil option of regulating personal status was argued to be a major social 
institutional constraint. Such features of the SDT as marital postponement, 
alternative living arrangements and frequency of divorce were argued to be 
directly influenced by the unavailability of the civil option. 
 
In particular, changes in public opinion in regards to the question of desirability 
of instituting civil marriage in Israel were analyzed. These shed light on the 
prospects of changing the existing legislation. They also shed light on the 
worldviews of people who object to the liberalization of the institution of 
marriage. The study concluded that the religious and nationalistically oriented 
groups have increased over time their potential to shift the balance in this state-
society-religion matter. Implications for further progression of the SDT in Israel 
were discussed. 
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6.2 Conclusions and implications 
Several conclusions may be drawn from the empirical findings presented in this 
dissertation. Firstly, it was confirmed that high heterogeneity in a variety of 
attitudes and demographic behaviours is a prominent characteristic of Israeli 
society in the last decade, and that it is most likely to stay for some time to 
come. Friedlander (2002) reached the same conclusion in regards to Israel’s 
fertility. The current research extended this conclusion to other family related 
behaviours and attitudes. 
 
Secondly, population composition effects were shown to be a strong social 
force that is capable of reversing attitudinal and behavioural long-term trends. 
The composition of Israel’s population changed drastically due to the 1990s 
migration from the former Soviet Union. It also changed gradually due to the 
differential natural increase of various religious groups. This latter gradual 
change has a potential for more far reaching implications than the migrational 
wave.  
 
In particular, extremely high natural increase of the most religious groups 
implies that the attitudinal and behavioural differences among the groups in 
Israel are likely to maintain in the future. The contemporary variety of 
worldviews and behaviours in Israel is even likely to rise in the short- and 
medium-term, despite the previously expected convergence to an Israeli 
average. This may result in increase of social cleavages and political conflicts 
that have been described elsewhere (Arian et al. 2009, 2010; Bystrov and Soffer 
2012; Smooha 2004, 2005). 
 
In practical terms, since the young Ultra-Orthodox population cannot sustain 
itself independently, it will continue relying on the state support in supplying its 
basic economic and security needs. At the same time, the ageing secular 
population cannot sustain the total population in the long-term. Redistributive 
justice questions might intensify the already existing struggles. According to 
Eisenstadt (2011), “[t]he 2009 elections indicated both a clear shift in the 
 124 
direction of religious and political struggles, but at the same time, the fragility 
of the political frameworks.” (p. 39). 
 
Secondly, such institutional and social-structural characteristics, as state-
religion and society-religion relations, can be regarded as constraining rather 
than neutral factors. Sustainability of the non-liberal institutions tends to 
augment the complexity of the inter-group relations, and restrict individual 
choices up to violation of human rights (Barak 2002). Interestingly, the 
allegedly remote from politics question of instituting civil option for regulating 
personal status is, nonetheless, tightly connected with the national-political 
individual attitudes. Non-permissive personal attitudes towards liberalizing the 
institution of marriage in Israel seem to be another form of expression of 
nationalistic views, radical political attitudes and intolerant attitudes towards 
the out-groups. 
 
Thirdly, expressions of nationalism in family related questions in Israel is more 
likely to be connected to internal Jewish identity, religion and belonging to the 
Jewish people than to external identity, territorial borders and relations with the 
Arab neighbours. This conclusion does not contradict the argument that 
nationalistic outlook that separates between in- and out-groups is the one 
responsible for some family related outcomes (Fogiel-Bijaoui 2002). 
Nevertheless, it is important to differentiate between the two concepts in order 
to identify the forces that operate behind basic social phenomena and to 
investigate their implications.  
 
From the theoretical perspective, this research also contributed to strengthening 
the external validity of the concept of emancipative values (Welzel 2013), as 
well as providing an additional support for the SDT premises. Since 
emancipative values are a recent elaboration of a more established concept of 
self-expression values, testing them within the family related domain was 
highly important. Emancipative values have been found to be strong predictors 
of marital postponement, which is an important SDT feature. They also have 
been shown to be associated with intergenerational change within populations 
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that are undergoing the SDT, but not with those populations which do not 
exhibit demographic transitional patterns. Thus, emancipative values proved to 
be a reliable instrument that contributes both to the human empowerment 
framework and the SDT theoretical framework. 
 
Finally, integrating individual-level analysis for highlighting some critical 
aspects of macro-level phenomena, such as the SDT, proved to be crucial not 
only for understanding deviant behaviours, outliers and peculiarities, but also 
for illuminating the necessary conditions for the onset and further progression 
of the whole process. One can learn from this academic exercise, for example, 
that the traditionalism-modernism paradox will be a persistent feature of the 
Israeli society for years to come. One can also learn that without major value 
change, no significant relaxation of traditional family behaviours can take 
place. These conclusions may well be projected on other pre-transitional and 
transitional societies in Eastern Europe and the Middle East.  
 
6.3 Directions for future research 
This dissertation has limitations which open opportunities for future research. 
Firstly, the relations between the change in value orientation and change in 
demographic behaviour have been investigated in the current research only at 
the aggregate level, and only in regards to age at marriage. It would be 
interesting to extend this line of research to other SDT related behaviours at the 
individual level as well. It is expected that the predispositions and mechanisms 
behind the effects at the individual level would be similar to what has been 
shown at the aggregate level.  
 
Secondly, methodological challenges and the lack of data have prevented 
testing many potentially revealing hypotheses in regards to the progression of 
the SDT in Israel. For example, direct links at the individual level between 
value orientations and demographic behaviour could hardly be established, and 
where it was possible, they were established in a very narrow sense. In 
particular, emancipative value change at the individual level in Israel could not 
be directly connected to demographic outcomes, for the data were lacking. 
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Thirdly, many interesting connections need additional empirical examination: 
the connection between attitudes toward gender roles and demographic 
outcomes, the impact of interactions between religiosity, nationalistic outlook 
and traditional views of gender roles on demographic outcomes, the mechanism 
behind the non-support for institution of civil marriage and the mechanism 
behind the relations between demographic outcomes and emancipative value 
change. 
 
Questions that remain open for future research are: how does the absence of 
civil marriage in Israel affect the family formation and marriage dissolution 
patterns in Israel? How will it affect the trends in cohabitation and alternative 
living arrangements in the future? How does it affect the attitude formation in 
regards to family among the young people? Will the majority of population in 
Israel in a few decades support such statements as: “Satan is not a conqueror, 
not an imperialist, not a capitalist, not an exploiter. He is a seducer. He comes 
with Barbie dolls and cocktails and provocative TV programs and movies and, 
worst of all, emancipated women”38? In the meantime, there is no clear answer 
to these questions.  
 
  
                                                   
38
Citation from Bernard Lewis (1997, p. 127), where he refers to Islamic fundamentalist views 
of the West, in particular, the U.S. 
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Appendices 
 
Appendix 1: Descriptive statistics of the variables in the seemingly 
unrelated regression models (indices from 0 to 1) 
 Minimum   
 
Maximum Mean Standard 
deviation 
Age at marriage at 1T  
0.04 0.64 0.34 0.17 
Age at marriage at 2T  
0.08 0.98 0.55 0.22 
Emancipative values at 1T  
0.29 0.60 0.42 0.06 
Emancipative values at 2T  
0.23 0.64 0.48 0.09 
HDI at 1T  
0.28 0.82 0.68 0.11 
HDI at 2T  
0.33 0.88 0.75 0.11 
Tertiary education for women at 
1T  
0.00 0.80 0.18 0.16 
Tertiary education for women at 
2T  
0.00 0.94 0.34 0.22 
GNI at 1T  
0.00 0.83 0.29 0.20 
GNI at 2T  
0.00 0.99 0.41 0.26 
Change in age at marriage 0.01 0.54 0.21 0.13 
Change in emancipative values  -0.08 0.16 0.06 0.06 
Change in HDI -0.05 0.17 0.07 0.04 
Change in tertiary education for 
women 
-0.01 0.60 0.16 0.13 
Change in GNI -0.11 0.36 0.12 0.09 
 
 
Appendix 2: Pearson correlations between age at marriage, emancipative 
values, tertiary education for women, GNI and HDI (N=49) 
 Singulate age 
 at marriage 
Emancipative 
 values 
Human  
Development 
Index 
Tertiary  
education for 
women 
GNI 
1T  2T  1T  2T  1T  2T  1T  2T  1T  2T  
Singulate age 
at marriage 1
T  1.00 
0.81 
 
1.00 
        
2T  
Emancipative 
values 1
T  0.60 
0.69 
0.64 
0.75 
1.00 
0.81 
 
1.00 
      
2T  
Human 
Development 
Index 
1T  
0.61 
0.57 
0.71 
0.72 
0.59 
0.59 
0.75 
0.75 
1.00 
0.94 
 
1.00 
    
2T  
Tertiary 
education for 
women  
1T  
-0.16 
0.05 
-0.13 
0.12 
0.01 
0.18 
0.06 
0.26 
0.18 
0.40 
0.16 
0.41 
1.00 
0.82 
 
1.00 
  
2T  
GNI 
1T  
0.67 
0.71 
0.71 
0.75 
0.64 
0.59 
0.77 
0.76 
0.79 
0.77 
0.77 
0.81 
-0.07 
-0.10 
0.17 
0.22 
1.00 
0.95 
 
1.00 
2T  
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Appendix 3: Summary of seemingly unrelated regression analysis of mean 
age at marriage and emancipative values in 49 countries 
 
Equation  Age at marriage  
at 2T  
Emancipative 
values at 2T  
(1) Age at marriage at 1T  
Change in emancipative values  
Constant 
0.90 (7.77)*** 
1.28 (3.78)*** 
0.16 (4.27)***  
 
(2) Emancipative values at 1T  
Change in age at marriage 
Constant 
 1.19 (9.23)*** 
0.20 (3.31)*** 
-0.06 (-1.21) 
 2R  
RMSE 
2  
0.67 
0.124 
140.60 
0.66 
0.055 
127.79 
 
Notes: Significance levels: n.s. p>0.05; **p≤0.05; ***p≤0.001. Entries are unstandardized 
regression coefficients; z-values in parentheses. Post-estimation tests for multicollinearity 
(VIF), and Breusch-Pagan / Cook-Weisberg test for heteroskedasticity reveal no violation of 
OLS assumptions in each regression equation; Breusch-Pagan test revealed that residuals were 
not independent across equations 
 
 Appendix 4: Seemingly unrelated regression analysis of mean age at 
marriage (in logits), emancipative values (in logits), and Human 
Development Index (in logits) in 49 countries  
 
Equation  Dependent variable 
 
Logit of age 
at marriage 
at 2T  
Logit of 
emancipative 
values at 2T  
Logit of HDI at 
2T  
(1) Logit of age at marriage at 1T 1  
Logit of change in emancipative values  
Logit of change in HDI 
Constant 
0.94 (8.16)*** 
1.25 (3.01)** 
1.57 (3.36)*** 
0.05 (0.21)  
  
(2) Logit of emancipative values at 1T  
Logit of change in age at marriage  
Logit of change in HDI 
Constant 
 1.19 (9.05)*** 
0.14 (2.69)** 
0.16 (0.93) 
0.10 (0.92) 
 
(3) Logit of HDI at 1T  
Logit of change in age at marriage  
Logit of change in emancipative values  
Constant 
  0.98 (14.76)*** 
0.13 (3.33)*** 
0.14 (1.04) 
0.25 (4.55)*** 
 
2R  
RMSE 
2  
0.68 
0.643 
160.16 
0.67 
0.227 
127.61 
0.89 
0.181 
453.32 
 
Notes: Significance levels: n.s. p>0.05; **p≤0.05; ***p≤0.001. Entries are unstandardized 
regression coefficients; z-values in parentheses. Post-estimation tests for multicollinearity 
(VIF), and Breusch-Pagan / Cook-Weisberg test for heteroskedasticity reveal no violation of 
OLS assumptions in each regression equation; Breusch-Pagan test reveals independence of 
residuals across equations 
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Appendix 5: Seemingly unrelated regression analysis of age at marriage, 
emancipative values, and GNI in 49 countries 
 
Equation Independent variables  Dependent variable 
 
Age at marriage 
at 
2T  
Emancipative 
values at 
2T  
GNI at 
2T  
(1) Age at marriage at 
1T  
Change in emancipative values 
Change in GNI 
Constant 
0.81 (6.49)*** 
0.84 (2.45)** 
0.50 (2.30)** 
0.16 (4.39) ***  
  
(2) Emancipative values at 
1T  
Change in age at marriage 
Change in GNI 
Constant 
 1.05 (8.81)*** 
0.11 (1.95)* 
0.35 (2.40)*** 
-0.03 (-0.55) 
 
(3) GNI at 
1T  
Change in age at marriage 
Change in emancipative values 
Constant 
  1.16 (17.69)*** 
0.13 (1.48) 
0.66 (2.99)** 
0.00 (0.15) 
 2R  
RMSE 
2  
0.70 
0.119 
141.02 
0.70 
0.051 
158.74 
0.91 
0.079 
609.84 
Notes: Significance levels: n.s. p>0.05; **p≤0.05; ***p≤0.001. Entries are unstandardized 
regression coefficients; z-values in parentheses. Post-estimation tests for multicollinearity (VIF) 
and Breusch-Pagan / Cook-Weisberg test for heteroskedasticity reveal no violation of OLS 
assumptions in each regression equation; Breusch-Pagan test revealed that residuals were not 
independent across equations 
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Appendix 6: Seemingly unrelated regression analysis of z-standardized 
singulate mean age at marriage, emancipative values, and Human 
Development Index in 49 countries 
 
Equation Independent variables  Dependent variable 
 
Age at 
marriage at 
2T  
Emancipative 
values at 
2T  
HDI at 
2T  
(1) Age at marriage at 
1T  
Change in emancipative 
values 
Change in HDI 
Constant 
0.73 (8.23)*** 
0.34 (3.87)*** 
0.17 (2.22)** 
0.00 (-0.04)  
  
(2) Emancipative values at 
1T  
Change in age at marriage 
Change in HDI 
Constant 
 0.76 (9.21)*** 
0.29 (3.53)*** 
-0.11 (-1.29) 
0.00 (0.00) 
 
(3) HDI at 
1T  
Change in age at marriage 
Change in emancipative 
values 
Constant 
  0.88 
(13.84)*** 
0.15 (2.86)** 
0.01 (0.11) 
0.00 (0.00) 
 2R  
RMSE 
2  
0.67 
0.567 
153.48 
0.66 
0.579 
130.53 
0.88 
0.336 
401.38 
Notes: Significance levels: n.s. p>0.05; **p≤0.05; ***p≤0.001. Entries are unstandardized 
regression coefficients; z-values in parentheses. Post-estimation tests for multicollinearity 
(VIF), and Breusch-Pagan / Cook-Weisberg test for heteroskedasticity reveal no violation of 
OLS assumptions in each regression equation; Breusch-Pagan test reveals independence of 
residuals across equations 
 
 
 
Appendix 7: Number of children by self-definition of religious identity of 
Jewish women in Israel in the Guttman Center surveys 2009-2010 
 
Religious identity Mean number of children 
(standard deviation) 
N 
Secular  1.92 (1.33) 505 
Traditional 2.29 (1.60) 299 
Religious 2.97 (2.09) 118 
Ultra-Orthodox 3.44 (2.84) 87 
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